ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Mr. Hudak has been detained since August 16, 2002, on several charges: conspiring to provide defense services to foreign persons without license from the Department of State, using explosive materials during the commission of a felony, exporting defense services without a license, being an alien in possession of a firearm, importing defense articles without a license, and possessing unregistered destructive devices. His trial is currently set for October 15, 2003, and on August 29, 2003, the district court denied his supplemental motion and alternative request for conditions of release. Mr. Hudak appeals the denial of his release request, arguing that his nearly fourteen-month detention violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process. We agree with the district court’s very thorough assessment of this claim, and we affirm for the reasons stated in the district court’s order, particularly in light of the imminent trial setting. 1

Detention of a criminal defendant pending trial does not violate a defendant’s due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, so long as the confinement does not amount to punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-37, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). In considering whether Mr. Hudak’s detention has been excessively prolonged and is no longer regulatory, but punitive, the district court considered several factors: the length of detention; the extent of the prosecution’s responsibility for the trial delay; the strength of the evidence of flight risk and dangerousness, upon which the detention was originally based. See United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating factors). The court also consid *490 ered the seriousness of the charges, the strength of the government’s case, the complex nature of the case, and whether the either side needlessly added to the complexity of the case. The district court’s assessment of the factors was thorough, complete, and its findings were correct. 2 AFFIRMED.