ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

One day Christopher Newsom and his son walked out of their home to find a strange dog attempting to break into then-chicken pen. It seems Mr. Newsom’s son was none too pleased and shot the dog. In the ensuing commotion, though, it was somehow Mr. Newsom who found himself charged with animal cruelty and the reckless discharge of a firearm. Though the charges were dropped in the end, Mr. Newsom sued various governmental entities and a witness for instigating them, alleging that they violated his federal constitutional rights as well as state law.

Applying Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the district court held that Mr. Newsom’s amended complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief. To be sure, Mr. Newsom’s pleading listed many causes of action — false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, tor-tious interference with business contract, and negligent failure to train, among others. But his amended complaint did little more than recite the elements of those causes of action, without explaining which defendants committed which wrong or how. And as Twombly instructs and the district court held, that type of pleading “will not do.” 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

On appeal, Mr. Newsom advances no argument that the district court improperly applied Twombly and Iqbal, that his amended complaint satisfied Twombly and Iqbal, or that the district court otherwise erred in dismissing his complaint under Rule Í2(b)(6). He does challenge the defendants’ alternative argument for affir-mance (that they are immune from suit). But he never challenges their primary contention and the district court’s holding that the amended complaint simply failed to state a claim. Although we appreciate Mr. Newsom is proceeding pro se and we must take special care to review his pleadings liberally, his filings simply supply no reason to think the district court erred in applying the Supreme Court’s controlling directions on adequate pleadings. Without such a reason, we must and do affirm. See, e.g., Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 911 (10th Cir. 2012) (even pro se litigants waive arguments they fail to raise).