*613 ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Rebecca Untisz appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to her former employer, the City of Greenwood Village, on her claims of gender discrimination and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. She contends — in what amounts to only four pages of appellate argument — that the district court erroneously concluded that (1) her allegations of gender bias were insufficient to support an inference that the City terminated her employment because she is female, and (2) she failed to proffer any evidence of gender discrimination that created a hostile work environment. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 6-9; Aplt.App. at 225-227 (Order Granting Summary Judgment).

Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.” Squires v. Breckenridge Outdoor Educ. Ctr., 715 F.3d 867, 872 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a). “In making this determination, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Macon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 743 F.3d 708, 712-13 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of this case, and we need not restate either here. Having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law pursuant to the above-mentioned standard, we hold that Ms. Untisz has failed to identify any reversible error in this case. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons stated in its order granting the City’s motion for summary judgment.