Watson v. CIR

Appellate Case: 23-9001 Document: 010111056673 Date Filed: 05/29/2024 Page: 1

FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 29, 2024

_________________________________

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court MICHAEL J. WATSON; TRACEY L.

WATSON; WATSON INSURANCE COMPANY; WATSON FAMILY INSURANCE COMPANY; WATSON METALS,

Petitioners - Appellants, v. No. 23-9001

(CIR No. 12220-21, 12223-21, 17350-21, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL 30612-21, 30613-21, and 30615-21) REVENUE, (U.S. Tax Court)

Respondent - Appellee.

_________________________________ ORDER * _________________________________

Before CARSON, ROSSMAN, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. **

_________________________________ Petitioners Michael J. and Tracey L. Watson, the Watson Family Insurance Company, and the Watson Insurance Company filed separate but similar motions to

*

This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

**

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. dismiss for lack of jurisdiction before the United States Tax Court. 1 The Tax Court consolidated the cases and denied Petitioners’ motions to dismiss. Petitioners filed an interlocutory appeal seeking immediate review of the Tax Court’s denial. But before we may review an interlocutory decision from the Tax Court, we must first examine our own jurisdiction. Because we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the Tax Court’s non-dispositive order in this case, we dismiss the appeal.

I.

In each case, we must ensure the existence of jurisdiction—“first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900)). Without appellate jurisdiction, we cannot proceed to the merits of the appeal, even if the merits include a jurisdictional challenge. In re Lang, 414 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005).

II.

Under I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1), we have jurisdiction to review the Tax Court’s decisions “in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.” 2 Generally, we may review only the Tax Court’s final decisions. 3 Minemyer v. Comm’r, 995 F.3d 781, 783 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Whitlock’s Est. v. Comm’r, 547 F.2d 506, 509 (10th Cir. 1976)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . .”). A final decision “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Luna-Garcia v. Holder, 777 F.3d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).

Petitioners contend that we have jurisdiction because the Tax Court denied their potentially dispositive motions to dismiss. But it is well-established, in cases before the district courts, that the denial of a motion to dismiss—even one based upon jurisdictional grounds—is not a final decision subject to immediate appellate review. Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corr., 846 F.2d 627, 629 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291); see also Catlin, 324 U.S. at 236 (“[A] denial of a motion to dismiss, even when the motion is based upon jurisdictional grounds, is not immediately reviewable.”). “By its very nature, the decision to deny a motion to dismiss is not final; rather than ending the litigation, it is a decision that [the litigation] will continue.” Conrad v. Phone Directories Co. Inc., 585 F.3d 1376, 1380 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Hatten-Gonzales v. Hyde, 579 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2009)). And because we review the Tax Court’s decisions “in exactly the same circumstances in which we review decisions by the district courts,” we conclude that the Tax Court’s order denying Petitioners’ motions to dismiss is not final. See Minemyer, 995 F.3d at 783 (quoting Sheperd v. Comm’r., 147 F.3d 633, 634 (7th Cir. 1998)).

Petitioners also assert that we have jurisdiction based on the collateral order doctrine. But that argument lacks merit. For the collateral order doctrine to apply, the order must (1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Gray v. Baker, 399 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989)). The Supreme Court consistently has held that “the denial of a claim of lack of jurisdiction is not an immediately appealable collateral order” because the denial is effectively reviewable on appeal after the district court (or, in this instance, the Tax Court) enters a final judgment. 4 E.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988) (citing Catlin, 324 U.S. at 236). So Petitioners have not established jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, nor have Petitioners met their burden in establishing appellate jurisdiction.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Entered for the Court Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge