Appellate Case: 24-2042    Document: 62-1    Date Filed: 03/04/2025    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          March 4, 2025
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

         Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.                                                          No. 24-2042
                                                    (D.C. No. 1:22-CR-00890-JB-1)
 GLEN A. JACKSON,                                              (D. N.M.)

         Defendant - Appellant.
                        _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

Before BACHARACH, MURPHY, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                 _________________________________

                                  I. INTRODUCTION

        Glen Jackson appeals from an order of the district court denying his motion to

suppress (Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 20) and supplemental motion to suppress (Dist. Ct. Dkt.

No. 38). This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 

. The district

court did not err in (1) concluding law enforcement’s interactions with Jackson

pre-arrest were a consensual non-seizure; (2) finding Jackson’s “self-search” of his

luggage was consensual; (3) concluding law enforcement had probable cause to arrest

Jackson after the self-search of the luggage; (4) concluding law enforcement had



        *
         This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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probable cause to seize Jackson’s luggage; and (5) finding the inventory search of

Jackson’s luggage was undertaken in good faith. Thus, the order of the district court

denying Jackson’s motions to suppress is affirmed.

                                     II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

        Because Jackson appeals “from the denial of motions to suppress, we recite the

facts in the light most favorable to the government and accept the district court’s

findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Briggs, 

 (10th Cir. 2013).

        Jarrell Perry is a Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) Special Agent. On April

29, 2022, Perry conducted an interdiction operation at the Greyhound bus station in

Albuquerque, New Mexico. Perry wore plain clothes and concealed his firearm,

badge, and handcuffs. DEA Task Force Officer Ray Zamarron accompanied Perry on

the interdiction operation. Like Perry, Zamarron was wearing plain clothes and did

not have a firearm, badge, or handcuffs visible. The officers boarded an eastbound

Greyhound bus. Perry stood at the rear of the bus, waiting for passengers to board.

Zamarron stood at the front, behind the driver’s seat, not blocking the exit. There

were fifteen to twenty people on the bus.

        After questioning other passengers, Perry approached a passenger named

Osorio,1 showed him his badge, and asked him questions. When speaking to Osorio,


        1
            Neither the district court order nor the record reflects Mr. Osorio’s first
name.
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Perry stood to the rear of Osorio’s seat, partially in the aisle. Perry told Osorio he

was searching for “contraband.” Perry did not tell Osorio he could refuse consent to

have his belongings searched. Osorio did not consent to Perry searching his bags.

When Perry asked Osorio to open his bag to show Perry its contents, Osorio did so.

Inside Osorio’s opened bag, Perry saw packaging and bundles. Seconds later, Perry

arrested Osorio for possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of

cocaine. Zamarron walked Osorio to the front of the bus.

      Perry then approached Jackson, who was sitting across the aisle from where

Osorio was sitting and saw Osorio’s questioning and arrest. Displaying his DEA

badge, Perry told Jackson: “I’m a police officer, and we check the bus here. I’m sure

you saw me. May I speak to you for a moment?” Jackson responded, “yeah.” While

interacting with Jackson, Perry stood just behind Jackson’s seat, in the aisle.

Zamarron remained at the front of the bus, behind the driver’s seat. Perry spoke to

Jackson for roughly three-and-a-half minutes. Perry asked Jackson about his travel

plans. Jackson told Perry he was traveling from Perris, California, to Oklahoma.

Perry asked if he could see Jackson’s bus ticket. Jackson showed a digital ticket,

listing the name “Rashad Mitchell.” Perry then asked Jackson for his identification

card. Jackson handed Perry an identification card with a Georgia address, listing a

June 2, 1979, date of birth, and the name Glen A. Jackson, Jr. Jackson confirmed that

he was a Georgia resident. After reviewing Jackson’s ID for “just a few seconds,”

Perry returned it to Jackson. In Perry’s professional experience, it is common to see



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individuals delivering illegal narcotics traveling to a destination that does not

correspond to their home address.

      There were two bags on the floor next to Jackson: a white Dolce & Gabbana

shopping bag on top of a black duffle bag. Perry asked Jackson if Jackson was

traveling with luggage. Jackson responded that he had luggage in the cargo hold. He

also reached down to identify the white Dolce & Gabbana shopping bag as his own,

but not the black duffle bag. Perry asked whether Jackson had any additional luggage

in the bus cabin. Jackson responded in the negative. Perry asked Jackson if he would

“voluntarily consent for a search of the bag you have with you for contraband.”

Jackson did not answer whether he would permit Perry to search his white Dolce &

Gabbana bag. Nevertheless, Jackson showed Perry the contents of the white Dolce &

Gabbana by opening the bag and moving his hands quickly around inside the bag. In

Perry’s experience as a DEA agent, it is common for passengers searching their own

bags in his presence to move things around inside the bag in a quick and nervous

manner if they have an item they do not want a DEA agent to see. When Jackson was

moving his hands around the inside of the white Dolce & Gabbana bag, Perry did not

tell him to go slower or show him particular items in the bag. After moving his hands

around the inside of the Dolce & Gabbana bag, Jackson left the bag on the floor.

      Perry again asked Jackson if he would permit Perry to search the white Dolce

& Gabbana bag for contraband. Perry did not tell Jackson he could refuse consent to

have his belongings searched. Nevertheless, Jackson denied having contraband and

said: “I don’t give consent to search my stuff.” Perry responded by informing

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Jackson it was his right to refuse the search. Perry asked Jackson if the black duffle

bag under the white Dolce & Gabbana bag belonged to Jackson. Jackson responded

in the affirmative. In Perry’s professional experience, it is common for passengers

who have illegal narcotics in a bag to attempt to distance themselves from that bag by

not claiming it as their luggage. Perry asked Jackson to show him the contents of the

black duffle bag. Jackson lifted his black duffle bag from the floor, arose from his

seat, and placed the black duffle bag on the empty window seat next to him. While

doing so, Jackson stood in front of the aisle seat, facing the window, in part blocking

Perry’s view. Perry stood just behind Jackson’s seat, in the aisle, with one foot

partially behind Jackson’s seat and the other foot partially in the aisle. Jackson

showed Perry the black duffle bag’s contents by opening the bag and quickly moving

the items inside the bag. Perry saw bulges and thin, clear plastic inside the clothing in

Jackson’s bag. Perry thought the plastic was vacuum-sealed or heat-sealed. In Perry’s

experience as a DEA agent, he observed heat-sealed or vacuum-sealed plastic during

interdiction operations on hundreds of occasions and, every time, it contained illegal

narcotics or proceeds from the sale of illegal narcotics. Perry thought there were

bundles of plastic-wrapped narcotics inside the bulging clothing in the black duffle

bag.

       Perry arrested and handcuffed Jackson and told him he was under arrest “for

the contents of your bag.” During Perry’s interactions with Jackson, Perry addressed

Jackson as “sir.” Perry consistently used the words “please” and “thank you.” Before

the arrest, Perry did not touch Jackson, display any weapons, or make any threats.

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Before Perry arrested Jackson, Zamarron did not interact with Jackson or obstruct the

aisle of the bus.

       After Perry arrested Jackson, one of the officers removed from the bus the

white Dolce & Gabbana bag, black duffle bag, and a blue rolling duffle bag Jackson

stored in the cargo hold. At that time, DEA had in effect an “Inventory Search

Policy.” In his capacity as a special DEA agent, Perry conducts inventory searches of

all items he takes into custody after an arrest, regardless of whether he believes the

items contain narcotics. DEA agents, including Perry, searched all three of Jackson’s

bags in a processing room at the Albuquerque DEA office. At that time, the DEA did

not have a search warrant. In the white Dolce & Gabbana shopping bag, the DEA

found 1.10 gross kilograms of heroin in a clear plastic, heat-sealed bundle. In the

black duffle bag, the DEA found 3.25 gross kilograms of marijuana in six clear

plastic, heat-sealed bundles. Perry recorded the results of the inventory search, both

contraband and non-contraband, in the appropriate DEA forms. The DEA initially

sent the non-narcotic items found in Jackson’s bags “to the ADO Non-Drug Evidence

Custodian for storage and safekeeping.” It ultimately returned the non-narcotic items

found in Jackson’s bags to Jackson’s attorney.

B. Procedural Background

       Jackson was indicted on a single count of possessing heroin with intent to

distribute, in violation of 

(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). In response to the

indictment, Jackson filed a motion to suppress and a supplemental suppression

motion. Jackson’s suppression motions asserted that several aspects of his

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interactions with Perry violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court

denied Jackson’s motions in a thorough 116-page order. In so doing, the district court

made the following controlling factual findings and/or legal determinations:

(1) Perry’s interactions with Jackson were consensual; (2) Jackson’s voluntary

decision to show Perry the contents of his luggage was a consensual “self-search”;

(3) Perry had probable cause to arrest Jackson, and to seize his luggage, after

Jackson’s self-search of the luggage; and (4) the inventory search of Jackson’s

luggage was properly undertaken in conformity with DEA policy and conducted in

good faith. Jackson appeals.

                                   III. ANALYSIS

A. Consensual Encounter

      Jackson asserts the district court erred in concluding his interactions with

Perry, up through and including the asserted self-search of his luggage, were

consensual. Cf. Florida v. Bostick, 

 (1991) (holding that a

consensual encounter is not a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment

and, thus, need not be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).

Instead, according to Jackson, he was subject to an illegal detention because a

reasonable person in his position would not have understood he was free to decline

any interaction with Perry. Cf. United States v. Drayton, 

 (2002)

(holding that the “Fourth Amendment permits police officers to approach bus

passengers at random to ask questions and to request their consent to searches,

provided a reasonable person would understand that he or she is free to refuse”).

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“The unlawful detention inquiry is fact-intensive.” United States v. Guerrero,

 (10th Cir. 2007) (alteration and quotation omitted). This court

reviews “the district court’s fact findings for clear error.” 

 “[T]he ultimate issue of

whether a seizure occurred” is, however, a question of law this court reviews de

novo. 

      To help determine whether a police-citizen encounter is sufficiently coercive

as to amount to a seizure, this court examines the following:

      (1) the location of the encounter, particularly whether it occurred in an
      open place within the view of people other than officers or a small,
      enclosed space without other members of the public nearby; (2) the
      number of officers involved; (3) whether an officer touched the defendant
      or physically restrained the defendant’s movements; (4) the officer’s
      attire; (5) whether the officer displayed or brandished a weapon;
      (6) whether the officer used aggressive language or tone of voice that
      indicated compliance with a request might be compelled; (7) whether and
      for how long the officer retained the defendant’s personal effects, such as
      identification; and (8) whether the officer advised the defendant that he
      had the right to terminate the encounter.

United States v. Tafuna, 

, 1201 (10th Cir. 2021). Jackson bears the

burden of demonstrating he was detained. 

 Consideration of the factors identified

in Tafuna alongside the district court’s factual findings, which Jackson does not

contest on appeal, compels the conclusion a reasonable person in Jackson’s position

would have felt free to terminate the encounter with Perry.

      Perry approached Jackson in the presence of fifteen-to-twenty bus passengers.

 (first factor). Only Perry interacted with Jackson; Zamarron stood at the front of

the bus leaving the exit clear. 

 (second factor). Perry did not touch or restrain

Jackson and did not block his route to the aisle. 

 (third factor). Both Perry and

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Zamarron were in plain clothes without visible firearms, badges, or handcuffs. 

(fourth and fifth factors). Perry used polite language and a friendly tone when

interacting with Jackson and did not make any threats. Indeed, Perry initiated the

encounter by asking Jackson the following question: “May I speak with you for a

moment?” 

 (sixth factor). Perry possessed Jackson’s ID for a “few seconds” before

returning it and never took possession of any of his other property before his arrest.

 (seventh factor). Furthermore, Perry affirmed before Jackson’s self-search of his

black duffle bag that Jackson had a right to refuse a search of his bag. See 

 (eighth

factor). Thus, a consideration of the relevant factors demonstrates Perry’s

interactions with Jackson prior to Jackson’s arrest bear the undeniable hallmarks of a

consensual encounter.

      That conclusion is confirmed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Drayton,

which held that circumstances materially indistinguishable from those present here

did not amount to a seizure. 

. This court’s precedents are in

accord. See, e.g., United States v. Easley, 

 (10th Cir. 2018);

United States v. Broomfield, 

 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Tapia, 

 (10th Cir. 2002). Jackson does not meaningfully

engage with any of this authority. Instead, he identifies four facts he contends

demonstrate the encounter was sufficiently coercive to convey to a reasonable person

he was not free to terminate the encounter: (1) Perry displayed his badge and told

Jackson that he was a police officer; (2) Perry did not affirmatively advise Jackson he

could end the encounter; (3) Jackson witnessed Osorio’s arrest; and (4) the bus’s

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“quarters” were “cramped.” As the United States notes, however, identical facts were

present in Drayton and, importantly, the Court rejected the assertion they converted

an otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure. See Drayton, 

(holding that mere presence of badge, uniform, or holstered weapon is not a weighty

consideration); 

 (rejecting rule requiring officers to advise passengers of

their right not to cooperate before an encounter can be consensual); 

 (“The

arrest of one person does not mean that everyone around him has been seized by

police.”); 

 (explaining that the confinement of a bus rider’s movements

is “the natural result of choosing to take the bus” and “says nothing about whether

the police conduct is coercive”). The district court did not err in concluding that the

encounter between Jackson and Perry was consensual at all points prior to Jackson’s

arrest.

B. Luggage Search

          Jackson asserts the district court erred in concluding that the “self-search” of

his luggage was consensual. “Voluntary consent is a longstanding exception” to the

Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. United States v. Guillen, 

 (10th Cir. 2021). “The exception applies when the government proves (1) the

officers received either express or implied consent and (2) that consent was freely

and voluntarily given.” 

 The district court concluded the government met its




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burden as to both requirements.2 Each determination entails a finding-of-fact this

court reviews for clear error. 

       The district court did not clearly err in finding Jackson consented to self-

searches of his luggage. When Perry asked Jackson if he would voluntarily consent to

a search of the white Dolce & Gabbana bag, Jackson did not respond. Nevertheless,

Jackson showed Perry the contents of that bag by opening it and moving his hands

quickly around inside the bag. When Jackson was moving his hands around the inside

of the Dolce & Gabbana bag, Perry did not tell him to go slower or direct him to

display items in the bag. Perry again asked Jackson if he would permit Perry to

search the Dolce & Gabbana bag for contraband. Jackson specifically refused

consent, stating “I don’t give consent to search my stuff.” Perry responded by

informing Jackson it was his right to refuse the search. Perry then asked Jackson to

show him the contents of the black duffle bag. Jackson lifted that bag from the floor,

arose from his seat, and placed it on the empty window seat next to him. Jackson

showed Perry the black duffle bag’s contents by opening the bag and quickly moving

the items inside the bag. Consent may be granted “through gestures or other

indications of acquiescence.” Guerrero, 

. The district court did not

clearly err in finding the conduct described above amounted to express or implied


       2
        Alternatively, the district court concluded Jackson’s self-search of his
luggage did not amount to a search at all and, therefore, did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment. Because this court concludes, as set out below, that the district court did
not clearly err in concluding Jackson’s self-search of his luggage was consensual, it
is unnecessary to address the more difficult question of whether the conduct at issue
here amounted to a Fourth Amendment search.
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consent. See Guillen, 

; see also United States v. Patten, 

 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a defendant communicated consent

when he opened his suitcase in response to an officer’s request to be allowed to

search).

      Nor did the district court clearly err in determining Jackson’s consent was

freely and voluntarily given. As the Supreme Court noted in Drayton, when “the

question of voluntariness pervades both the search and seizure inquiries, the

respective analyses turn on very similar facts.” 

; see also United

States v. Jones, 

 (10th Cir. 2012) (setting out voluntariness-of-

consent-to-search factors very similar to the factors this court used in Tafuna to

determine whether a police-citizen encounter was consensual). Thus, for those

reasons set out above in concluding Jackson’s interactions with Perry during the

search of the luggage was a consensual encounter, the district court did not clearly err

in finding Jackson consented to the self-searches of his luggage. That is, Perry did

not touch Jackson, display his weapon, or make any threats. He used a friendly tone

and was the only officer to interact with Jackson. And, importantly, when Jackson

declined Perry’s request to allow Perry to search the Dolce & Gabbana bag, Perry

responded by telling Jackson that it was his right to refuse to consent.

C. Probable Cause to Arrest Jackson and Seize His Luggage

      Jackson argues his arrest, along with the corresponding seizure of his luggage,

was improper. He contends it was not a “foregone conclusion” he was engaged in

criminal activity or that his luggage contained contraband. Jackson’s arguments,

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however, are based on inapposite case law. In support of his proposed “foregone-

conclusion” standard, Jackson cites to this court’s decisions in United States v.

Johnson, 

 (10th Cir. 2022), and United States v. Corral, 

 (10th Cir. 1992). These cases, however, deal with warrantless searches in

general and the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement in particular.

Johnson, 

; Corral, 

.3 Instead, the appropriate

question is the one asked by the district court: was there probable cause to believe

Jackson was committing a crime and probable cause to believe evidence of that crime

or contraband was in Jackson’s luggage. See Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 

 (10th Cir. 2020) (“A warrantless arrest is permissible

when an officer has probable cause to believe that a person committed a crime.”

(quotation and alteration omitted)); Johnson, 

 (holding seizure of an

object is appropriate if there exists “probable cause to believe it [is] contraband or

evidence of a crime”). Probable cause “requires only a probability or substantial



      3
          To be clear, Corral involved both a plain-view seizure and a plain-view
search. Corral explained, however, that the standards applicable were not
coterminous. Compare 

 (holding that a plain-view seizure is proper
when there exists a “practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is
involved” (quotation omitted)), with 

 (“In cases involving closed containers,
. . . the plain view doctrine may support the warrantless seizure of a container
believed to contain contraband but any subsequent search of the concealed contents
of the container must be accompanied by a warrant or justified by one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement.”), and 

 (“However, where the contents of a
seized container are a foregone conclusion, this prohibition against warrantless
searches of containers under the plain view doctrine does not apply.”). Thus, Jackson
is simply wrong to argue that either his arrest or the seizure of his luggage was only
appropriate if it was a foregone conclusion there were drugs in his luggage.
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chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Illinois v. Gates,

, 243 n.13 (1983). It “is not a high bar,” but instead requires “only the

kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal

technicians, act.” Kaley v. United States, 

 (2014) (quotations and

alterations omitted). This court examines “the events leading up to the arrest, and

then decide[s] whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an

objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” Hinkle, 

 (quotation omitted). The ultimate question of whether probable cause existed

is one of law this court reviews de novo. United States v. Valenzuela, 

 (10th Cir. 2004).

      The district court correctly concluded Perry had probable cause to arrest

Jackson. During the consensual encounter, Perry learned Jackson was traveling under

an assumed name and “to and from places where he did not live.” See United States

v. Gordon, 

 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting how the defendant was

travelling on a train under an assumed name contributed to existence of probable

cause). Jackson failed to disclose the black duffle bag belonged to him when Perry

first approached him. See Johnson, 

 (concluding a similar lie about

non-ownership of luggage contributed to existence of probable cause). Jackson

furtively positioned himself in front of Perry while conducting the self-search of the

black duffle bag and was “evasive and harried” while revealing the bags’ contents.

See 

 (holding that “furtive efforts . . . can factor into the probable cause

analysis” (quotation omitted)). Perry could see bulges and heat-sealed plastic inside

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Jackson’s duffle bag. Nevertheless, Jackson falsely denied that there was anything

other than clothes in his duffle bag. See 

 (holding that presence of items indicative

of drug trafficking in luggage supports probable cause); United States v. Moore,

, 244 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that “lying to an officer is not

consistent with innocent travel”). Perry testified that each of these factors were

indicative of narcotics trafficking based on his experience. In particular, he testified

he (1) had encountered individuals concealing narcotics inside clothing anywhere

from 50 to 100 times and the bulges he saw were consistent with concealed narcotics;

(2) in his twenty-three years as a DEA agent he saw the same vacuum sealed plastic

“hundreds of times” and all those previous occasions it contained either illegal

narcotics or proceeds from illegal narcotics; and (3) he never saw similar vacuum

sealed plastic that did not contain illegal narcotics or proceeds therefrom. The district

court properly relied on Perry’s “experience in deciding whether probable cause

exists.” Ornelas v. United States, 

 (1996). Because the facts

available to Perry at the time of Jackson’s arrest allowed a reasonable police officer

to conclude there was a substantial chance Jackson was engaged in criminal activity,

the district court did not err in concluding Jackson’s arrest was supported by probable

cause. See Hinkle, 

.

      Perry likewise had probable cause to seize Jackson’s luggage. Under the plain

view doctrine, an officer may seize evidence without a warrant if “(1) the officer was

lawfully in a position from which the object seized was in plain view, (2) the object’s

incriminating character was immediately apparent (i.e., there was probable cause to

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believe it was contraband or evidence of a crime), and (3) the officer had a lawful

right of access to the object.” United States v. Angelos, 

 (10th Cir.

2006); see also supra note 3. All three requirements are satisfied here. Perry was

lawfully able to view inside Jackson’s duffle bag because Jackson voluntarily opened

it. The incriminating character of the plastic-wrapped bundles was immediately

apparent to an experienced officer like Perry. That is, the same facts that support

Perry’s probable cause to arrest Jackson also gave him probable cause to believe the

luggage contained contraband or evidence of criminal activity. Johnson, 

 (so concluding). Finally, Perry was lawfully on the bus. Accordingly, the

district court correctly concluded Perry’s seizure of Jackson’s bags was lawful.

D. Inventory Search of Luggage

      Jackson contends the district court erred in concluding Perry’s post-arrest

inventory search of Jackson’s luggage was valid. “Inventory searches are . . . a well-

defined exception to the warrant requirement.” Colorado v. Bertine, 

 (1987). Such a search is valid “only if conducted according to standardized

procedures.” United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 

 (10th Cir. 1997).

“An inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover

incriminating evidence, but rather an administrative procedure designed to produce

an inventory.” 

. On appeal, Jackson raises a narrow challenge to the

inventory search: it was conducted in bad faith for purely investigatory purposes.

“Whether an administrative search is a pretext for a criminal investigation is a factual

question,” subject to review only for clear error. United States v. Johnson, 

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740, 742-43 (10th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Nielsen, 

(8th Cir. 2023) (“We . . . review the district court’s findings of fact regarding the

circumstances of an inventory search for clear error, including the question of

pretext.”).

       The district court found no evidence of pretext on the part of Perry. That

finding is fully supported by the record. As the district court noted, Perry testified he

conducts inventory searches of all items he takes into custody after an arrest

regardless of whether he expects them to contain narcotics. Furthermore, the district

court’s findings detail at length the various DEA forms Perry filled out in conducting

the search in accordance with DEA’s standardized practice in conducting inventory

searches. Perry testified at the hearing on Jackson’s suppression motions and the

district court obviously found him credible. Indeed, this court cannot find in the

record any evidence calling into question the district court’s finding that Perry

undertook the inventory search in good faith. That being the case, Jackson’s

challenge to the inventory search necessarily fails.




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                                IV. CONCLUSION

      For those reasons set out above, the order of the United States District Court

for the District of New Mexico denying Jackson’s motion and supplemental motion

to suppress is hereby AFFIRMED.


                                           Entered for the Court


                                           Michael R. Murphy
                                           Circuit Judge




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