Hoid v. Gray Media Group

Appellate Case: 25-1058 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2025 Page: 1

FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 10, 2025

_________________________________

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court EDWARD HOID,

Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 25-1058

(D.C. No. 1:24-CV-01127-PAB-CYC) GRAY MEDIA GROUP, INC., d/b/a CBS (D. Colo.) KKTV 11,

Defendant - Appellee.

_________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before HARTZ, EID, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________ Edward Hoid sued Gray Local Media, Inc. in state court, asserting defamation- related claims based on news content that Gray Media had published about him. 1 Gray Media removed the case to federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted Gray Media’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Colorado’s statute of limitations for defamation claims barred Hoid’s action. He appeals pro se from the dismissal. 2 We have jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Hoid’s claims are based on Gray Media’s reporting about the death of Randall Schubert, a 71-year-old man who died on November 16, 2020, from injuries sustained 11 days earlier. Hoid contends that Schubert died from an improperly treated subdural hematoma resulting from a fall from his bicycle. He alleges that Gray Media falsely reported that Hoid had murdered Schubert as part of a robbery and assault.

Hoid filed his complaint in state court on February 29, 2024. The complaint asserts claims for defamation, placing Hoid and his family in a false light, and child endangerment. Gray Media removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.

Gray Media then filed a special motion to dismiss the complaint under Colorado’s Anti-SLAPP statute. 3 Among other things, Gray Media argued that Hoid could not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on his claims because he had filed his complaint after the statutory limitations period expired.

Although given several extensions to do so, Hoid did not timely respond to the motion to dismiss. A magistrate judge recommended granting the motion. The district court accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed the action with prejudice. The district court found that Hoid’s complaint was untimely under Colorado’s one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims and that he had not shown that the limitations period should be equitably tolled.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of an action under an Anti-SLAPP statute. See Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 590 F.3d 638, 643 (9th Cir. 2009). We also review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of statutes of limitations. United States v. Piette, 45 F.4th 1142, 1159 (10th Cir. 2022).

Gray Media argues that Hoid’s appellate arguments do not provide a basis to overturn the district court’s judgment. We agree.

“The first task of an appellant is to explain to us why the district court’s decision was wrong.” Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015). In his 83-page brief Hoid makes only a few, scattered references to that there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-1101(3)(a). the statute of limitations. The closest he comes to an argument on that issue is in his unsupported, conclusory statements that his claims are exempt from any limitations period. He also contends, without elaboration, that the district court’s “fraudulent concealment and refusals of subpoenas did make it impossible to file sooner” and that he “was hand writing [sic] claims while incapacitated and under maximum security prison scrutiny.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 49. These isolated, undeveloped statements do not adequately raise an appellate issue for our review. Any challenge to the dismissal based on the statute of limitations is therefore waived. See Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived . . . [as are] arguments that are inadequately presented . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 4 Although Hoid raises many other contentions in his opening brief, he has not shown that they warrant reversal of the district court’s dismissal of his complaint as untimely.

And even if we were to reach the merits, we would affirm the district court’s decision. Defamation claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations under Colorado law. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-103(1)(a). 5 Gray Media posted its article about Hoid on November 18, 2020, thus beginning the running of the statute. He did not bring his claims until February 29, 2024, long after the statute of limitations had expired.

The district court further held that Hoid failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. We review a district court’s denial of equitable tolling for an abuse of discretion. Braxton v. Zavaras, 614 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010). The district court determined that Hoid failed to show that either his incarceration or his alleged incapacity from improperly treated diabetes warranted equitable tolling of the relevant limitations period. In particular, the court cited Hoid’s failure to explain precisely when he became incapacitated after he was arrested on November 27, 2020, which was after the statutory limitations period had already begun running. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of equitable tolling under the circumstances. 6

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s dismissal. We grant Hoid’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees.

Entered for the Court Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge unspecified “claims” with either an agency or the courts in 2021, “while incapacitated,” R. at 608. In light of this litigation activity during these crucial years after his alleged injury in this case, he fails to show that the district court erred in denying equitable tolling based on his incarceration and/or alleged incapacity.