In this breach of contract case, we affirm the magistrate judge’s grant of judgment n.o.v. reducing damages awarded to the franchisees, denial of judgment n.o.v. as to the franchisor’s liability, and denial of the franchisees’ motion for attorney’s fees.1

FACTS

In 1976, Katherine Apostoleres became the sole shareholder of Minerva, Inc., which owned the rights to a Dunkin’ Donuts of America, Inc. (Dunkin’) franchise in Brandon, Florida. In 1978, Apostoleres became the sole shareholder of Rosebud, Inc., which owned the rights to a Dunkin’ franchise in Temple Terrace, Florida. Aposto-leres and her family (the franchisees) operated both stores.

In early 1982, Dunkin’ offered to all its franchisees the right to renew the term of the franchisee’s existing franchise agreement for an additional ten years at a fixed cost of $5,000. In return, the franchise owner would be required to participate in a program to abide by advertising decisions favored by at least two-thirds of the local franchise owners in a given television market. Apostoleres refused to accept the offer because she did not want to be bound by the “two-thirds” clause.

In August, 1982, Dunkin’ employees audited Apostoleres’s Temple Terrace and Brandon stores including use of the “yield and usage” method which projects a store’s gross sales by taking the weights of a small number of donuts and extrapolating how many donuts should have been produced based upon those weights. The franchisees’ agreements with Dunkin’ did not provide authority to conduct an audit based upon such methodology.

In late 1982, the audits revealed that reported sales generally agreed with the sales run through the cash registers, bank deposits, and tax returns for the audited period; however, the yield and usage analysis detected an apparent underreporting of gross sales at both stores. The franchisees denied any underreporting and asserted that the yield and usage analysis provided inherently unreliable results.

In September, 1985, Dunkin’ again audited the franchisees’ stores. The audit of the Temple Terrace store disclosed no un-derreporting. The audit of the Brandon store reflected an underreporting of gross sales based upon the yield and usage analysis. The audit also detected a substantial difference between the total of sales rung into the registers at the Brandon store and the total of sales actually reported to Dun-kin’. In a June 17, 1986 letter, Dunkin’ gave the franchisees notice of immediate termination of the franchises.

Despite the notice of termination and the ensuing litigation, the franchisees have continued to operate profitably the two stores as Dunkin’ franchises.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June, 1986, Dunkin’ filed a two-count complaint alleging that the franchisees breached provisions of the franchise agreements. Both counts sought damages and injunctive relief as a result of the franchisees’ alleged acts of failing to record and report all sales and failing to pay Dun-kin’ the appropriate percentages on those unreported sales.

In July, 1986, the franchisees filed a five-count counterclaim against Dunkin’. Count I alleged that Dunkin’ had breached the obligation of good faith implied in the franchise agreements; Count II alleged that Dunkin’ had breached a fiduciary duty; Count III alleged a violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act; Count IV alleged a violation of a Massachusetts unfair business practices statute; and Count V alleged that a Dun-kin’ employee had slandered Apostoleres. The franchisees sought monetary relief and injunctive relief prohibiting Dunkin’ from attempting to terminate either of the franchise agreements by reason of the alleged underreporting of sales.

*1569In response to a motion Dunkin’ filed, the district court dismissed Counts II and IV of the counterclaim. On January 25, 1989, the parties jointly requested that the district court refer the case to a United States magistrate judge for all further proceedings, including trial, and the district court granted the motion. The trial commenced in September, 1989, and the jury returned a verdict against Dunkin’ on its breach of contract claim, against the franchisees on the slander claim, and in favor of the franchisees on their breach of contract claim, awarding the franchisees $650,-000. The franchisees filed a notice of tender of their franchise rights.

On December 8, 1989, the magistrate judge granted Dunkin’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to damages and reduced the $650,000 award to a nominal award of $2. The magistrate judge also granted conditionally Dunkin’s motion for partial new trial as to the franchisees’ counterclaims to the extent that the judgment n.o.v. should be reversed on appeal, but denied Dunkin’s motion for judgment n.o.v. on the issue of Dunkin’s liability. On January 5, 1990, the magistrate judge denied the franchisees’ application for attorney’s fees and awarded costs of $7,122.31 to the franchisees. On February 27, 1990, the magistrate judge denied the franchisees’ petition for injunctive relief asking the magistrate judge to enjoin Dunkin’ from committing continued breaches of the franchise agreements. Both Dun-kin’ and Apostoleres now appeal.2

CONTENTIONS

Apostoleres contends that the magistrate judge erred in entering judgment n.o.v. with respect to damages and erred in conditionally granting a new trial with respect to her counterclaim. Apostoleres also contends that the magistrate judge erred in denying her motion to recover attorney’s fees. Finally, Apostoleres contends that the magistrate judge properly denied Dun-kin’s motion for judgment n.o.v. or new trial on the issue of Dunkin’s liability.

Dunkin’ contends that the magistrate judge erred in denying Dunkin’s motion for judgment n.o.v. or new trial as to Dunkin’s liability. Dunkin’ also contends that the magistrate judge properly granted Dun-kin’s motion for judgment n.o.v. concerning damages, properly conditionally granted Dunkin’s motion for partial new trial, and properly denied Apostoleres’s motion for reasonable attorney’s fees.

ISSUES

The issues are: (1) whether the magistrate judge erred in denying Dunkin’s motion for judgment n.o.v. or new trial on the issue of Dunkin’s liability; (2) whether the magistrate judge erred in entering judgment n.o.v. with respect to damages; and (3) whether the magistrate judge erred in denying Apostoleres’s motion for attorney’s fees.

DISCUSSION

The standard of review for the grant or denial of a motion for judgment n.o.v. is the same as that applied by the district court. Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1989). We consider all the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party, such that a reasonable jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict, then the motion should be granted. Carter, 870 F.2d at 581. On the other hand, if substantial evidence opposed to the motion exists, such that reasonable people might reach different conclusions, then the motion should be denied. Miles v. Tennessee River Pulp and Paper Co., 862 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1989).

I. Dunkin's Liability

Under Massachusetts law, an implied obligation of good faith exists by op*1570eration of law in every contract.3 See Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1378 n. 15 (1980).

Dunkin’ argues that no credible evidence shows that Dunkin’ breached its implied obligation of good faith. According to Dunkin’, it had scheduled the 1982 audits in the summer of 1981, before Apostoleres rejected the 1982 franchise renewal program. Dunkin’ also asserts that the 1985 audit of the Brandon store showed a continuing unfavorable variance, and an unusually large discrepancy between the sales rung through the registers and the sales reported to Dunkin’.

Nevertheless, Dunkin’ cannot ignore testimony by Apostoleres, her employees, accounting experts, and a former Dunkin’ employee which belies Dunkin’s contention that it acted in good faith. In denying Dunkin’s motion for judgment n.o.v. on the issue of Dunkin’s liability for breach of the implied obligation, the magistrate judge concluded that sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to find that:

(1) the 1982 audits conducted of defendants’ stores were substantially motivated by Mrs. Apostoleres’ refusal to subscribe to a franchise renewal option agreement offered by plaintiff; (2) the yield and usage test used by plaintiff to audit the stores had not been disclosed in the franchise agreements as a measure which plaintiff would utilize to enforce its contractual rights and was not an appropriate and reasonably accurate accounting tool in the trade to detect un-derreporting; and (3) the terminations were not based on good cause because there was no intentional underreporting.

After careful study of the record, we agree that a reasonable jury could have found that Dunkin’ breached its obligation of good faith and fair dealing.

Dunkin’ next argues that the magistrate judge should have granted Dun-kin’s motion for a new trial because Dun-kin’ was denied a fair trial as a result of Apostoleres’s lawyer’s repeated and wrongful attempts to impassion the jury. According to Dunkin’, opposing counsel referred throughout trial to Dunkin’s attempt to “take the stores away” or to “steal the stores,” notwithstanding instructions from the court to refrain from so doing. Dun-kin' asserts that during jury deliberations, the jury sent out written questions which demonstrate that the jury was improperly concerned with the effect its verdict would have on the franchise relationship. Dun-kin’ further contends that Frederick Raffa, an economist, improperly testified as to the fair market value of the two stores because fair market value was not a proper measure of recovery. Finally, Dunkin’ argues that the magistrate judge erred in refusing to give a jury instruction explaining that if the jury concludes that the franchisees had breached either or both of the franchise agreements, the jury would not by that determination alone cause the stores to be forfeited.

In reviewing the magistrate judge’s denial of Dunkin’s motion for new trial, we find no abuse of discretion. See Blu-J, Inc. v. Kemper C.P.A. Group, 916 F.2d 637, 643 (11th Cir. 1990) (district court’s denial of a motion for new trial reviewed for abuse of discretion). Dunkin’ failed to object to the denial of its requested jury instruction, and has therefore waived this issue. Electro Services v. Exide Corp., 847 F.2d 1524, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1988). With respect to alleged inflammatory remarks made by Apostoleres’s lawyer during trial and Raf-fa’s testimony concerning the measure of damages, the magistrate judge corrected any possible prejudicial effect by specifically instructing the jury to disregard references to taking the stores away, and instructed the jury that the proper measure of damages in the case was not the franchises’ market value. See Lanham v. Whitfield, 805 F.2d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 1986).

*1571II. Apostoleres’s Damages

Upon a material breach by Dunkin’ of the franchise agreements, it is undisputed that Apostoleres was entitled to recover compensatory or expectancy damages — an amount intended to put Apostoleres in the position she would have been had Dunkin’ fully performed under the agreements. Sullivan v. O’Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (1973). If appropriate, such damages include lost future profits. Knightsbridge Marketing Services v. Promociones Y Proyectos, S.A., 728 F.2d 572, 575-76 (1st Cir. 1984). The parties also agree that assuming Dunkin’ materially breached the franchise agreements, Apos-toleres could suspend her performance under the franchise agreements and sue for total breach. Center Garment Co. v. United Refrigerator, 369 Mass. 633, 341 N.E.2d 669, 673 (1976).

Apostoleres, however, did not suspend her performance. Nevertheless, Apostoleres argues that she preserved her claim for damages by filing the counterclaims. Specifically, Apostoleres contends that upon the jury’s finding of material breach by Dunkin’, she is entitled to sever her relationship with Dunkin’ and recover damages which include lost future profits over the remaining term of the franchise agreements, though she acknowledges that she must first tender her interest in the franchises to Dunkin’. In response, Dun-kin’ argues that Apostoleres presented no evidence that Dunkin’s breach damaged the franchisees, and that because Apostoleres continued to perform under the franchise agreements and refused to pay Dunkin’ compensation for the alleged underreport-ing, Apostoleres failed to preserve her right to rescind the agreement. According to Dunkin’, because Apostoleres never explicitly reserved her right to cease performance, Dunkin’ conducted its actions and litigated its case on the basis that Aposto-leres intended to remain in the stores with claims only to enjoin Dunkin’ from terminating the franchise agreements and to recover damages for breach of contract.

In Cities Service Helex, Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1306, 1313, 211 Ct.Cl. 222 (1976), the court examined the effect of continued performance after a material breach of contract:

A material breach does not automatically and ipso facto end a contract. It merely gives the injured party the right to end the agreement; the injured party can choose between canceling the contract and continuing it. If he decides to close the contract and so conducts himself, both parties are relieved of their further obligations and the injured party is entitled to damages to the end of the contract term (to put him in the position he would have occupied if the contract had been completed). If he elects instead to continue the contract, the obligations of both parties remain in force and the injured party may retain only a claim for damages for partial breach. [Footnote and citations omitted.]

See Kass v. Todd, 362 Mass. 169, 284 N.E.2d 590, 593-94 (1972) (builder who continued to perform and submitted bills after owner’s breach could not recover on quantum meruit).

A fair reading of Apostoleres’s counterclaim reveals no indication that Apostoleres brought her lawsuit on the theory that Dunkin’ committed breach, and in response to such breach, she wished to stop performance and recover lost future profits. In fact, Apostoleres sought injunctive relief to prevent Dunkin’ from “unlawfully terminating or attempting to terminate Counter-claimant’s franchises.” Concerning damages, Apostoleres’s counterclaim states that her businesses “have been damaged and have or will suffer the complete destruction of their business and business reputation, including the loss of goodwill,” and she therefore seeks compensatory damages. Apostoleres never pleaded relief seeking to terminate or rescind the franchise agreements. In response to a standard arbitration interrogatory asking “in detail the elements of damage for which the plaintiff contends they are entitled to recover,” Apostoleres responded, “[c]om-pensatory damages for lost business.”

At the pretrial conference held eleven days before trial, it was unclear whether *1572Apostoleres had based her theory of recovery on damages suffered to the stores’ ongoing operations, or rather on damages that would occur should she choose to stop operating the donut stores.4 Dunkin’s lawyer noted that testimony concerning the future value of the franchises should not be considered relevant because Apostoleres had not requested relief which would require Dunkin’ to buy back the franchises. Dunkin’s counsel recognized that Aposto-leres “contended that we breached the franchise agreement by violating an implied obligation of good faith, but [she has not] identified any cognizable damages, and that’s the problem.” The magistrate judge deferred further consideration of the damages issue until a second pretrial conference six days later. At that time, the magistrate judge determined that the measure of damages would be lost profits and lost future profits assuming Apostoleres could prove they were caused by Dunkin’s conduct.

Apostoleres argues that Dunkin’ assented to Apostoleres’s continued performance because it chose to maintain the franchise relationship and not pursue its request for injunctive relief terminating the agreements; thus, her failure to sever the relationship with Dunkin’ should not bar her from recovering relief as if the agreement had prematurely ended. Dunkin’, however, simply chose to not pursue preliminary in-junctive relief. Moreover, though Dunkin’ was aware that Apostoleres considered Dunkin’s actions a breach of the agreements, nothing indicates that Dunkin’ was aware, or should have been aware, that Apostoleres intended to end the agreements. In fact, Dunkin’ argues that had it known of such an intention, Dunkin’ might have withdrawn its termination notices and not filed a lawsuit at all.

Cities Service notes that in Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546, 197 Ct.Cl. 118 (1972), the court held that an injured party may continue performance in certain circumstances and yet reserve its right to claim a material breach without the breaching party’s assent. 543 F.2d at 1314. In that case, however, Northern He-lex notified the government that it con*1573sidered the government’s failure to make payments a material breach which Northern Helex did not waive by the acceptance of payments or the continuation of performance. 455 F.2d at 552. Apostoleres made no such reservation.

The Northern Helex court also recognized “a special set of qualifying facts.” 455 F.2d at 551. Northern Helex, a seller of helium to the government, had its helium extraction plant bound to other petrochemical operations such that the helium operation had to be continued whether Northern Helex wasted the helium or sold it to the government, the only buyer interested in the product. In this case, contrary to her contention, Apostoleres need not have operated the donut stores to maintain financial stability. At any time, she was free to sell her interest in the franchises.

We conclude that Apostoleres is entitled to recover only for those lost profits or lost future profits related to her ongoing operation caused by Dunkin’s breach. Because, in Apostoleres’s counsel’s own words, “this record is deplete of any evidence demonstrating that my clients were damaged in the interim from the time that they were audited or sought to be terminated and until today,” the magistrate judge properly granted judgment n.o.v. as to damages.5

III. Attorney’s Fees

Paragraph 14 of the franchise agreements provides:

In the event of any default on the part of the FRANCHISEE, ... the FRANCHISEE shall pay to DUNKIN’ DONUTS all damages, costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, incurred by DUNKIN’ DONUTS as a result of any such default; and all damages, costs and expenses including reasonable attorneys’ fees, may be included in and form a part of the judgment entered in any proceedings brought by DUNKIN’ DONUTS against the FRANCHISEE.

Apostoleres argues that paragraph 14 is ambiguous because it is unclear whether the restriction of an award of attorney’s fees to Dunkin’ in the language before the semicolon also applies to the language after the semicolon. According to Aposto-leres, ambiguous contract language should be construed against the party making the contract, and because Dunkin’ created the franchise agreement, paragraph 14 should be interpreted to allow an award of attorney’s fees to the franchisees. Alternatively, Apostoleres asserts that paragraph 14 unambiguously permits an award of attorney’s fees to either the franchisor or the franchisee.

Whether contract language is ambiguous is a question of law subject to plenary review. In re Sublett, 895 F.2d 1381, 1383-84 (11th Cir. 1990). The magistrate judge ruled that paragraph 14 is unambiguous and provides that only Dunkin’ may recover the attorney’s fees it has incurred. The magistrate judge reasoned that the language after the semicolon simply qualifies and expands on the preceding clause in accord with general rules of grammatical construction. After examining the entire agreement between Apos-toleres and Dunkin’, we agree that paragraph 14 permits only Dunkin’ to recover attorney’s fees.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the magistrate judge’s rulings in all respects.

AFFIRMED.

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Although concurring in those parts of the opinion with respect to affirming the rulings against Dunkin’ Donuts, I dissent with respect to the principal holding in this case because the majority misreads the record at a critical point and for that or some other reason fails to apply long-established legal principles governing a party’s right to elect a particular remedy when two or more are available to him.

*1574This is a simple case. Dunkin’ wanted to escape from its franchise contracts with Apostoleres, sent her notices of termination of their agreements, and then sought termination in the district court when she refused to accede. Apostoleres replied by denying that Dunkin’ had cause to terminate the contracts and by counterclaim sought damages for Dunkin’s breach. The jury saw the error of Dunkin’s ways and awarded $650,000 in damages to Aposto-leres for loss of profits during the balance of the contracts. Apostoleres thereafter filed her notice of tender of franchise rights, acknowledging her obligation to tender her rights in the franchise agreements in return for the $650,000 awarded by the jury for lost future profits.

The resolution of this case has become needlessly confused by appellee Dunkin’ and the majority of this panel over the issue of Apostoleres’ continued operation of the franchises following Dunkin's notices of termination. If Apostoleres had ceased operation of the franchises at that time, she certainly would be entitled to damages for Dunkin’s total breach of contract. The majority holds that Apostoleres’ continuance prevents her from collecting any but nominal damages, because the continuance worked an “election of remedies” of damages for partial breach of contract. Yet by continuing performance, Aposto-leres reduced the damages due from Dun-kin’ for total breach of contract. It is inconceivable that such conduct, otherwise encouraged by the legal system, should prevent Apostoleres from recovering the full amount of the jury award.

On the issue of damages, Apostoleres’ appeal raises three issues: (1) Did Aposto-leres give Dunkin’ adequate notice of her intent to terminate the franchise relationship and seek damages for total breach of contract? (2) Should Apostoleres’ continued performance of the contract estop her from seeking damages for total breach of contract? (3) Given that Apostoleres properly preserved her claim for total breach of contract, what was the proper measure of her damages?

I.

Although its exact basis for decision is unclear, the majority seems to hold that Apostoleres had to reserve her right to seek damages for total breach while continuing performance.1 The record demonstrates that Apostoleres in fact made a sufficient reservation of rights in her counterclaim and during the course of the proceedings.

A. The Counterclaim

In June of 1986, Dunkin’ sent a letter notifying Apostoleres of its immediate termination of their franchise agreements, due to Apostoleres’ alleged breach of the agreements. Ten days later, Dunkin’ filed a complaint alleging breach of contract by Apostoleres. The complaint demanded “entry of judgment against Defendants MINERVA, INC. and KATHERINE APOSTO-LERES enjoining them from continuing to use and operate a Dunkin’ Donuts Shop and awarding to Plaintiff damages, plus interest, court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees and such other and further relief as may be appropriate under the circumstances.” 2 Apostoleres filed a counterclaim and asserted that she had suffered or would suffer “the complete destruction of [her] business”3 and requested “compensatory and punitive damages ... and such other and further relief as may be appropriate under the circumstances.”4

Apostoleres’ pleadings clearly request damages for Dunkin’s termination and repudiation of the contracts and meet the notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Since a franchise contract is a personal services con*1575tract and may not be specifically enforced,5 Apostoleres could not as a matter of law have sought to have the franchise contracts extended since Dunkin’ (as indicated by its notices of termination and complaint) was no longer willing to deal with her. In context, Apostoleres’ pleadings were sufficient to put Dunkin’ on notice that the contracts would be terminated as the result of the litigation. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the majority holding that Dun-kin’ should now prevail in its argument that it had no notice the contracts could be terminated, when it had terminated the contracts by its notices and its lawsuit. Dunkin’ merely elected not to seek by interlocutory relief immediate termination prior to trial.

The majority’s cramped interpretation of Apostoleres’ pleadings is in direct disobedience to the instructions for the construction of pleadings contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(f) states, “All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.” Because Aposto-leres has lost and will lose a substantial sum of money as the result of Dunkin’s wrongful termination and consequent lawsuit,6 “substantial justice” requires that her pleadings be read as asking for termination and damages for total breach of contract.

Furthermore, rule 54(c) unequivocally states, “[EJvery final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings.” Our cases have interpreted this rule liberally, “leaving no question that it is the court’s duty to grant whatever relief is appropriate in the case on the basis of the facts proved.”7 The only relevant limitation to this rule arises when a failure to ask for a particular relief substantially prejudices the opposing party.8 In this case, Dunkin’s defenses against Aposto-leres’ breach of contract claim were as relevant to a claim for damages for total breach of contract as to a claim for damages for partial breach of contract. And Dunkin’ specifically requested the termination of the franchise agreements, the exact relief granted by the jury and which Apostoleres’ now seeks to sustain. Dun-kin’ was not prejudiced, substantially or otherwise, by Apostoleres’ claim.9 Under a proper interpretation of the pleadings, Apostoleres did give Dunkin’ notice of her intention to give up the franchises and did reserve her right to seek damages for total breach of contract.

B. The Proceedings

The majority erroneously leaves the impression that Apostoleres never gave Dun-*1576kin’ explicit notice of her intention to accept Dunkin’s repudiation of the franchise agreements and to seek damages for total breach of contract in any of her pretrial filings or otherwise during the course of the litigation.10 The majority is correct that Apostoleres at one time asserted that she sought compensatory damages and did not mention damages for total breach.11 However, this assertion was made during an unsuccessful attempt at arbitration, when it was reasonable for the parties to narrow their differences. Apostoleres clearly and consistently requested termination and damages for total breach thereafter when arbitration failed. During discovery, Apostoleres’ attorney wrote Dun-kin’s attorney and stated,

Our primary position in the counterclaim will be that a failure of Dunkin’ Donuts being able to show that their termination of the franchise was proper will necessarily result in Dunkin’ Donuts having breached the franchise agreement. In that scenario and in cases where a franchisee has been wrongfully terminated, courts are unwilling to force a continued relationship between the parties. Accordingly, the relief is in damages. In a straight breach action resulting in wrongful termination, where the Court is unwilling to force a continued franchise relationship between the parties, the appropriate measure of damages would be the loss of business income for the remainder of the franchise term as well as the time, effort and money invested in the business. Essentially, it is unfair for a franchisor to allow a franchisee to create a viable business and subsequently terminate that business without good cause and to prohibit the franchisee from retaining the monies expended in developing the investment.12

Apostoleres also notified Dunkin’ of her intent to terminate the contracts and seek damages for total breach by way of her legal motions.13 In the pretrial stipulation, Apostoleres stated as an issue: “Should Defendants prevail in the defending against Plaintiff’s claim or should they prevail on the Counterclaims whether this Court should appropriately order a continued franchise[e]/franchisor relationship between the parties[?]” 14 In her trial brief, Apostoleres stated, “Defendants seek damages in the amounts of [the] value of the businesses that were wrongfully terminated.” 15 Apostoleres clearly put Dunkin’ on notice prior to trial as to the type of damages she was seeking. Following trial, Apostoleres formally tendered her franchise rights to Dunkin’.16

The majority asserts that Apostoleres did not clarify at the pre-trial conferences whether she sought damages for partial or total breach of contract.17 But Aposto-leres’ attorney argued,

The premise of this law and the foundation is that there’s one or two reliefs that would be available to my client. If [Dun-kin’] lose[s], then there’s one or two things that happens. We either get an injunction that says we stay married, or we get the damages for their wrongful attempt to divorce us. And the courts have said the first one is specific performance, we don’t like it, we don’t make people stay married. The second one is what you’re entitled to. And our position is, if they have wrongfully terminated us, then we get the value of the business.18

*1577Apostoleres did specify the theory under which she was seeking damages; Aposto-leres clearly sought termination and damages for the total breach. Obviously, Apostoleres could not receive specific performance and damages for a partial breach and also receive damages for a total breach.19

The pretrial stipulation, which by Rule 16 amends the pleadings and governs the trial of the case, states as part of “Defendants’ Statement of Its Case”: “In light of the unique relationship between a franchisee and a franchisor, the appropriate remedy for Plaintiff’s breach and acts would be to award Defendants the benefit of their franchise agreements for the remainder of the franchise terms and other damages allowable by law.” It is clear that Apostoleres was doing exactly what she had the right to do: (1) defend against Dunkin’s assertion that she had breached the contracts and (2) seek as damages for Dunkin’s breach of the contracts the value of the franchise for the balance of its term. It is a clear as a bell that Apostoleres was seeking from the court damages for Dunkin’s breach of the contract between the parties.

In sum, the counterclaim, other filings, and statements made during the course of the litigation clearly manifested Aposto-leres’ acceptance of Dunkin’s repudiation of the agreements and her intent to terminate the contracts. Apostoleres thus reserved her right to seek damages for total breach of contract.

II.

The majority is wrong on more than its interpretation of the record. The majority seems to hold that Apostoleres made an election of remedies by continuing performance without an explicit reservation of rights. This holding imports an antiquated20 doctrine into the law of Massachusetts that has been specifically rejected by that state’s courts. Massachusetts law is that, if no estoppel is created by the continued performance of a contract, no remedy has been elected, and damages for total breach of contract may be had.

A. The Election of Remedies Doctrine

The majority’s approach to the election of remedies doctrine has been rejected by the courts of Massachusetts, as well as most other courts. These courts look only to whether an estoppel was created in determining whether an aggrieved party has elected a remedy. These courts have adopted the position of Professor Corbin, who has written,

The view with respect to election of remedies that is now becoming the prevailing one and that ought to be accepted is that, where a party injured by a breach definitely manifests a choice of a remedy that is actually available to him, in the place of some other alternative remedy, such a manifestation will bar an action for the latter remedy, provided that the party against whom the remedy is asked made a substantial change of position in reliance on the manifestation of intention before notice of its retraction. This makes the conclusiveness of an “election” depend upon the existence of facts sufficient to create an “estoppel. ” Cases stating this view are now very numerous and hold either that the remedy asked was not barred because there was no basis for an estoppel, or that an election was conclusive only because such a basis had been proved. The mere bringing of a suit asking one remedy rather than another practically never affords ground for an estoppel and is not *1578sufficient reason to deny an application for an alternative remedy.21

In short, if there has been no estoppel created, there has been no conclusive election of remedies.

In the relatively recent case of Plunkett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,22 the Appeals Court of Massachusetts held that the plaintiffs’ actions in pressing for continued performance of an agreement, and their failure to take action to set aside the agreement, did not create an election of remedies such that the plaintiffs could not later attempt to set aside the agreement. In so holding, the court looked only to the fact that no estoppel was created by the plaintiffs’ attempts to seek continued performance of the agreement.23 The court noted, “The [plaintiffs] are not barred from seeking to enforce ... their claim against [the defendant] by any principle that they have elected to follow an inconsistent remedy without a clear attempt to rescind or set aside the 1972 agreement.”24 The court cited, inter alia, the above-quoted section of Corbin on Contracts in reaching its conclusion and remarked, “These authorities suggest that principles concerning election of remedies have been much modified in recent years.”25 The Plunkett case is precisely on point here, as Plunkett essentially holds that continued performance after a breach of an agreement does not, without an es-toppel, prevent a subsequent request for an inconsistent remedy. The majority therefore applies an incorrect analysis as a matter of state law.26

I add that many other authorities support the approach to election of remedies taken by Massachusetts. The influential Restatement (Second) of Contracts (also cited by Plunkett) states with regard to election of remedies,

If a party has more than one remedy under the rules stated in this Chapter, his manifestation of a choice of one of them by bringing suit or otherwise is not a bar to another remedy unless the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes his position in reliance on the manifestation.27

A large number of state courts have also adopted Professor Corbin’s view.28

*1579The Uniform Commercial Code is applicable by analogy to franchise agreements.29 The official commentary notes that the U.C.C. “rejects any doctrine of election of remedy as a fundamental policy.” Moreover, “Whether the pursuit of one remedy bars another depends entirely on the facts of the individual case.”30 By analyzing election of remedies on a case-by-case basis, the U.C.C. essentially adopts the Cor-bin view that an estoppel must be created for an election to bar relief.

Indeed, the principal case relied upon by the majority found an estoppel prior to finding an election of remedies. The majority quotes language from the decision of the former Court of Claims in Cities Service Helex, Inc. v. United States31 to support its holding that Apostoleres’ continued performance worked an election of remedies.32 Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court of Claims discussed three formulations of the doctrine. Under the strictest approach, “any act indicating an intent to continue the contract is an election.”33 The intermediate formulation of the doctrine allows a plaintiff to continue performance, provided an explicit reservation of rights is made.34 The most lenient view of the doctrine finds an election of remedies only when an estoppel is created.35 The majority seems to have selected the intermediate formulation for application here. However, the Cities Service Helex court reached its conclusion only after finding an election of remedies under all existing formulations of the election doctrine, including the estoppel approach.36 Even by the measure of its own citations, the majority is out-of-step with the great weight of authority in its failure to determine whether an estoppel was created by the continued performance of the franchise agreements. In doing so, the majority fails to follow binding Massachusetts law.

B. Was an Estoppel Created?

Massachusetts courts have defined the three elements of estoppel as follows:

(1) A representation or conduct amounting to a representation intended to induce a course of conduct on the part of the person to whom the representation is *1580made. (2) An act or omission resulting from the representation, whether actual or by conduct, by the person to whom the representation is made. (3) Detriment to such person as a consequence of the act or omission.37

The first element of estoppel is not satisfied here, as Apostoleres by her conduct did not indicate that she wanted to continue the contracts. The second element likewise is not satisfied. The majority notes Dun-kin’s argument that had it known of Apos-toleres’ intent to terminate the contracts, “Dunkin’ might have withdrawn its termination notices and not filed a lawsuit at all.”38 Dunkin’s contention that it would have retracted the termination notices is not convincing, because Dunkin’ never took such action after being clearly informed during the course of the litigation that Apostoleres make clear her right to elect to terminate the contracts and seek damages for total breach. Dunkin’s argument that it might not have filed the lawsuit in the first place is a red herring, because Aposto-leres would have surely (and rightly) filed a lawsuit for breach of contract if she had stopped performing on the contracts as the result of Dunkin’s termination notices.

The first two elements of estoppel are not present, and the third element — detriment — is clearly not. Apostoleres’ continuation actually served to mitigate the damages due to her as a result of Dunkin’s breach: Apostoleres’ damages were calculated from the date of the trial, not the date of the breach of the contracts.39 This is not a case where one side has “continue[d] after a material breach by the other (such as failure to pay), act[ed] as if the contract remain[ed] fully in force (although stopping performance would be fair and convenient), run up damages, and then go[ne] suddenly to court.”40 Apostoleres’ continued performance did not “run up damages” but instead lessened them. Indeed, Apostoleres had an affirmative duty to attempt to mitigate damages by continuing performance.41 I can conceive of no harm to Dunkin’ and it did not establish any. Dunkin’ therefore suffered no discernible detriment because of Apostoleres’ continued performance, and no estoppel was created.

Moreover, applications of both the doctrines of equitable estoppel and election of remedies depend on the avoidance of injustice.42 The injustice, if any, suffered by *1581Dunkin’ due to Apostoleres’ continued performance is difficult to pinpoint. Both sides were fully aware that something was amiss with the franchise relationship and that the contracts could be terminated as a result of the litigation. Dunkin’, through the notices of termination and the lawsuit, clearly sought the exact relief that Aposto-leres is entitled to by virtue of the jury’s award. That the jury did not find in Dun-kin’s favor does not change the fact that Dunkin’ knew from the very start of this litigation that termination of the contracts was a possible outcome.43 It takes two to continue performance, and Dunkin’ neither sought an immediate injunction against continued performance nor took any other measures to stop the operation of Aposto-leres’ franchises.

The jury’s verdict indicates that they believed Dunkin’ attempted to terminate the contracts in retaliation for Apostoleres’ opposition to Dunkin’s advertising plans; if Dunkin’s motive in bringing this suit was simply to harass Apostoleres, it has well succeeded. I can see no evidence that Dun-kin’ suffered an injustice due to Aposto-leres’ continuation and much evidence that Apostoleres will suffer an injustice from an application of equitable estoppel.

Even if an estoppel was created by Apos-toleres’ actions, the facts of this case show that an estoppel against an estoppel exists. By sending notices of termination and then filing a suit seeking to terminate the franchise contracts, Dunkin’ clearly indicated that it sought the relationship’s end. Apos-toleres may well have relied upon this representation in not specifically asking for termination of the contracts in her counterclaim. And Apostoleres is clearly suffering a detriment from Dunkin’s misrepresentation of its intentions as to the continuance of the contracts. “In such a situation there is an estoppel against an estoppel which, in Coke’s oft-quoted language, sets the matter at large. The one estoppel neutralizes the other.”44

The majority’s approach to election of remedies results in a gross injustice, which is evident by merely reading the facts. I would follow Plunkett and find that no estoppel — and thus no election of remedies — was created by Apostoleres’ continued performance.

III.

I must address the further question of whether Apostoleres was entitled to the full amount of the jury’s award of damages. The magistrate judge reduced the damages to one dollar for each franchise. The magistrate judge articulated two reasons for this reduction: First, “Massachusetts courts addressing the issue of the proper remedy for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the at-will employment context have rejected any attempt to fashion relief based on compensation for future services.”45 Second, the magistrate found no causal connection between Dunkin’s actions and Apostoleres’ claimed loss of the entire value of the business.46 However, the magistrate judge improperly analogized the franchise agreements to the at-will employment context, and she failed to recognize that she could not order the specific performance of the franchise contracts or that Apostoleres’ claim sounded in anticipatory repudiation.

A. The At-Will Employment Analogy

The magistrate judge should not have relied upon caselaw concerning at-will employment agreements, because those agree*1582ments by definition run indefinitely. The franchise agreements here were for a specific term of years. In cases involving employment agreements for a definite term, the Massachusetts courts allow recovery for wrongful termination to be based upon a calculation of the wages that would have been earned under the agreement.47

B. Apostoleres’ Loss

1. Specific Performance

The second rationale given by the magistrate judge for the reduction of damages was essentially that Apostoleres had suffered no tangible loss by virtue of Dunkin’s actions and so could not receive damages. But neither party was entitled to specific performance of the franchise agreements.48 Given that both parties had expressed a desire to terminate their relationship prior to the rendering of the jury’s verdict, the magistrate judge was without power to order (in effect) Apostoleres’ continued performance of the franchise agreements.49 The only alternative was for the district court to return the franchises to Dunkin’ in exchange for the jury’s award.

2. Anticipatory Repudiation

Another basis for affording Apostoleres the benefit of the jury’s award is that Dunkin’ committed a breach of contract by anticipatory repudiation. Dunkin’ wrongfully repudiated the franchise agreements, and Apostoleres accepted that repudiation. Because Apostoleres’ continued performance did not work an estoppel, she was entitled to terminate the agreements and receive the lost future profits of the franchises.

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states, “Where an obligor repudiates a duty before he has committed a breach by non-performance and before he has received all of the agreed exchange for it, his repudiation alone gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach.” 50 The Restatement defines a claim for damages for total breach of contract as “one for damages based on all of the injured party’s remaining rights to performance.”51 I note that Massachusetts is the only state that refuses to recognize actions for anticipatory repudiation of contracts.52 There are a number of exceptions to this refusal. One exception is that “when an anticipatory repudiation is accompanied by an actual breach, an action may be brought for breach of the entire contract at once.”53 In our case, *1583Apostoleres claimed (and the jury found) that Dunkin’ had committed an actual breach of the contract by wrongfully auditing Apostoleres’ records prior to Dunkin’s repudiation. Therefore, Apostoleres could maintain suit on an anticipatory repudiation in Massachusetts. A second exception arises from Massachusetts’ adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides for actions for anticipatory repudiation.54 As to the sale of goods, and by analogy to the franchise contracts involved here, Massachusetts has accepted the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation.55 Finally, Massachusetts may recognize an exception “where the contract may fairly be interpreted as establishing between the parties a present relation of mutual obligations.”56 Such a relationship was clearly formed through the parties' franchise agreements. In sum, Apostoleres’ claim for anticipatory repudiation fits squarely into several exceptions to Massachusetts’ anomalous refusal to allow such claims.

Dunkin’s actions in sending the notices of termination and in filing this lawsuit amounted to “an unqualified refusal, or declaration of inability, substantially to perform according to the terms of [its] obligation.” 57 Apostoleres was accordingly entitled to treat their relationship as at an end.58 But Apostoleres did not have to treat Dunkin’s notices of termination and lawsuit as a breach of contract. One court has written,

It would seem on principle that the declaration of such intention [not to carry out the contract] is not in itself and unless acted upon by the promisee a breach of the contract.... [S]uch declaration only becomes a wrongful act if the promisee elects to treat it as such. If he does so elect, it becomes a breach of contract, and he can recover upon it as such.59

Dunkin’ could have withdrawn its notices of termination and lawsuit prior to Aposto-leres’ manifestation of intent to treat the franchise agreements as over.60 As Professor Williston discusses, “[U]nless the repudiation is withdrawn it operates as a ‘continuing offer’ of a breach which may be taken advantage of at any time.”61 This court has held,

All that is required to close the door to repentance is definite action indicating that the anticipatory breach has been accepted as final, and this requisite can be supplied either by the filing of a suit or firm declaration, as here, that unless within a fixed time the breach is repudiated, it will be accepted.62

As discussed in part I.A, Apostoleres’ counterclaim should be construed as an acceptance of Dunkin’s repudiation and termination of the franchise agreements. *1584And as discussed in part I.B, during the course of the proceedings Apostoleres firmly accepted Dunkin’s breach as final. Thereafter, the locus poenitentiae ended, and Dunkin’ could not retract its repudiation of the parties’ agreements. The jury’s verdict sealed the matter, awarding Apos-toleres the value of the businesses. Dun-kin’s change of position in agreeing to continue with the contracts following the jury’s verdict was predictable but cannot erase its breach of contract by repudiation and Apostoleres’ acceptance thereof.

3. Conclusion

Whether due to the inappropriateness of specific performance or Dunkin’s anticipatory repudiation, Apostoleres was entitled to recover the full amount of the lost future profits of the franchises.63

IV.

By giving effect to Dunkin’s post-verdict desire to continue the contract and ignoring Apostoleres’ consistently expressed right to elect to terminate the contract, the magistrate judge essentially allowed the offender to select the victim’s redress. It is difficult to imagine a greater injustice. This injustice is magnified by the fact that the majority simultaneously must defy the facts of the case and Massachusetts law to affirm the magistrate judge’s reduction of Apostoleres’ damages. I respectfully dissent.64