. As I argued in the panel opinion, Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2004), I do not believe that the single document submitted in this case, which amounts to little more than a traffic ticket with a great many blanks left unfilled, constitutes such evidence, especially considering that the government had ample opportunity to submit additional evidence that could have clarified its meaning.

.A panel of this court reversed the BIA's decision and stayed Adefemi's deportation. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2003), withdrawn, Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 358 F.3d 828, 840. The original panel withdrew that decision, but issued another opinion that came to the same conclusion. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 358 F.3d 828, 840. This court vacated the second opinion and granted a rehearing en banc. Id. at 840.

. For the reasons stated in our previous opinion, we hold that we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 828, 831-33 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 358 F.3d 828, 840.

. INA § 241 (a)(2)(A)(ii) states: "Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether *1025confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is de-portable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (transferred from § 1251 in 1996).

. At the time, INA § 212(c), as interpreted by the courts, gave the Attorney General discretion to grant relief from deportation based on equitable factors. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1995), repealed by Pub. L. 104-208, § 304(b), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-597; Farquharson v. United States Attorney Gen., 246 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2001).

. INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) states: "Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (transferred from § 1251 in 1996).

. At the hearing, Adefemi stated that the police pulled him over for weaving through traffic lanes. At the § 212(c) hearing, Adefemi admitted to the officer who pulled him over that he had a pistol in the armrest of the car:

Q. Did he ask if you had a gun in the car?

A. Yeah. He asked me, I told him yeah.

Q. Why did you have a gun?

A. Yeah, I had a gun.

Q. Where did you have the gun in the car?

A. I put it in the, I got an armrest that’s got a compartment. I put it in there.

Q. In the armrest of the car you keep a gun?

A. (Indiscernible) yeah.

Q. What kind of gun?

A. .22.

Q. Pardon?

A. .22.

Q. .22 pistol?

A. Yes, sir.

The officer arrested Adefemi as a result of his possession of this pistol and Adefemi eventually went to traffic court. At the § 212(c) hearing, Adefemi testified:

Q. Did you plead guilty?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you plead guilty to?

A. Concealed weapon.

Q. And what were you charged, what was your sentence?

A. 330 dollars fine and I pay.

Q. Anything else, any other punishment?

A. No, that's it.

.INA § 241(a)(2)(C) states: "Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying ... any weapon ... which is a firearm ... in violation of any law is deporta-ble.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (transferred from§ 1251 in 1996).

Adefemi argues that the INS should have been estopped from pursuing the firearms offense as an additional charge of deportabili*1026ty. To establish estoppel against the government, Adefemi must prove, "in addition to the traditional elements of estoppel, some affirmative misconduct by the government.” Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999). Adefemi has demonstrated no affirmative misconduct by the government.

. The citation is a two-sided document from the City Court of Atlanta. The front side contains five sections. Section I, entitled "violator,” lists Adefemi’s name, address, car make and model, and other relevant identifying information. Section II, entitled "violation,” lists only one violation, which is "carrying concealed weapon in Violation of Code Section 16-11-126” of Georgia law. Under "remarks” in the "violation” section, several hand-written words appear, which state: "Driver had a 22 cal RG10 in console between seats.” Section III lists the location at which the officer pulled Adefemi over. Section IV is a summons that states the time and place at which Adefemi was ordered to appear in court. Section V is the arresting officer's certification that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Adefemi committed the offense mentioned in the document. The back of the document is a court record. A line near the top of the back page states "ON ARRAIGNMENT, THE DEFENDANT PLEADS.” The words "NOT GUILTY” are stamped in the blank next to those words. The word "FILED” is also stamped above the "NOT GUILTY” stamp. A box entitled "Appearance, Plea of Guilty and Waiver” appears immediately below the "NOT GUILTY” stamp. In that section, Ade-femi's signature appears after the statement: "I have been advised of my rights to be represented by counsel and have counsel appointed to represent me if I am indigent; plead not guilty and be tried by a jury or a judge; confront the witnesses against me and not give incriminating evidence against myself. I hereby waive these rights; state that I have not been induced by any threat or promise to enter this plea and do freely and voluntarily enter my plea of Guilly.” The words "state case” and "probation” are stamped below these words. The last paragraph of the document reads: "It is considered, ordered and adjudged that the defendant pay a fine of 330.00 Dollars and (in default of such payment) be confined for a term of [unreadable, but probably 12] months (in the _ County Public Works) (as the State Director of Corrections may direct) (in the City Prison). The confinement specified shall be suspended on payment of the fine and on condition defendant does not again violate the laws of Georgia.” A signature, presumably that of the presiding judge or,of the clerk, then appears in a blank after the words "[a]s provided by law, I hereby certify that the information on this ticket is a true abstract of the record of this court or bureau in this case.” A date stamp also appears.

. Burden of proof and standard of review are not the same thing.

The difference is most graphically illustrated in a criminal case. There the prosecution is generally required to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. But if the correct burden of proof was imposed at the trial, judicial review is generally limited to ascertaining whether the evidence relied upon by the trier of fact was of sufficient quality and substantiality to support the rationality of the judgment. In other words, an appellate court in a criminal case ordinarily does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence.

Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282, 87 S.Ct. 483, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966). Here, the inqui-xy is similar: Assuming the BIA applied the correct burden of proof-clear and convincing evidence-we ask merely whether the BIA's finding is supported by substantial evidence. We do not determine de novo whether the INS met its burden of proof to show deportability by clear and convincing evidence.

. The dissent cites Sandoval v. INS, 240 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001), Cortez-Acosta v. INS, 234 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2000), and Muiphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 605, 610-12 (9th Cir. 1995), as support for its argument that other courts apply a less deferential standard of review when the INS is required to prove its case by clear and *1028convincing evidence. These cases, however, do not support the dissent's argument and are not contrary to our interpretation of the substantial evidence test. In Sandoval, an Illinois state court had convicted Sandoval of possession of more than thirty grams of marijuana, but state law allowed Sandoval to collaterally attack his conviction. Sandoval, 240 F.3d at 578. The Illinois state court modified the conviction and sentenced Sandoval to twenty-four months of first-offender probation, a sentence that was only permissible if the state court vacated the original conviction and entered a new conviction for possession of not more than thirty grams of marijuana. Id. at 580. The state court, however, did not expressly vacate the original conviction. Id. Thus, the effect of the sentence modification was uncertain. Id. The INS instituted deportation proceedings and the BIA concluded that Sandoval was deportable; Sandoval appealed. Id. at 579-80. As a matter of law, the Seventh Circuit determined that the INS could meet its burden in the BIA by showing either "1) that the Illinois judge exceeded his authority under state law, thus rendering the [sentence] modification ineffective, or 2) that the sentence modification was legal but not effective for purposes of federal immigration law.” Id. at 581. Thus, the issues in Sandoval were questions of law. The Seventh Circuit determined that the INS’s arguments regarding these legal issues were incorrect. Because there was no evidence regarding whether Sandoval was found guilty of possession of more than thirty grams of marijuana, or less than thirty grams of marijuana, the Seventh Circuit determined that "the INS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Sandoval was convicted of possession of more than thirty grams of marijuana,” and reversed. Id. at 581-83. By contrast, in this case, there was only one state court proceeding and no legal questions are before us. In addition, the IJ in Sandoval incorrectly placed the burden of proof on the petitioner and the BIA did not rectify this problem. Id. at 581. Here, the IJ correctly placed the burden of proof on the INS. Thus, Sandoval is not on point.

In Cortez-Acosta, the issue was whether the alien previously had admitted encouraging, inducing, assisting, abetting, or aiding another alien to enter the United States illegally. Cortez-Acosta, 234 F.3d at 479-80. In that case, the alleged admission occurred during a hearing before an IJ, but there was no transcript of the hearing, and, thus, the only evidence that Cortez-Acosta actually admitted to such a crime was the notes of the hearing taken by the IJ. Id. at 478. "Without a record of the master hearing, [the Ninth Circuit] had no way to verify that the IJ actually asked Mr. Cortez-Acosta the questions he supposedly answered, that the questions were phrased clearly enough to be understood by someone relying on a translation, and that Mr. Cortez-Acosta’s answers were responsive to the questions asked. In short, we have no way to confirm the IJ’s findings or to review his decision for factual or legal error.” Id. at 482. In our case, by contrast, there is a record of the proceedings in the immigration court and, therefore, we can review that court's decision. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in Cortez-Acosta determined that, under the circumstances of that case, the deference due under the substantial evidence standard was not appropriate because such deference is due only “when the judge acts in the context of the adjudicatory process and his findings are effectively reviewable on appeal. When [as in Cortez-Acosta] the IJ acts outside this process, we treat his findings as the observations of an ordinary witness .... as evidence, rather than as findings of fact.” Id. at 482-83. Here, there is a record of Adefemi's proceedings in the immigration court and, therefore, deference to that court's findings is required.

In Murphy, the Ninth Circuit concluded that there was not substantial evidence for the BIA to conclude that the INS proved the petitioner's alienage by clear and convincing evidence. Murphy, 54 F.3d at 612. The INS attempted to demonstrate that the petitioner was not born in the United States Virgin Islands by showing the lack of any birth certificate, by introducing an unauthenticated INS form, and by introducing uncorroborated double hearsay statements. Addressing the INS form, the court stated that "the unauthenticated [form] merits little (if any) weight, as acknowledged by the BIA. Murphy disputed the significant information [listed on the form], such as place of birth, [and] names of parents.... Murphy also provided information regarding the source of the information recorded on the form, an INS informant who apparently had some ulterior motive to make statements against Murphy.” Id. atólO. The Murphy court concluded that the unauthenticated form and the lack of any other reliable evidence was insufficient to establish the petitioner's alienage. Here, the City Court of Atlanta document is an official court document, not an unauthenticated form of a government agency. Furthermore, Adefemi has *1029never contested the validity of the information contained in the document.

. We also note that there is other relevant evidence of Adefemi's conviction in the administrative record. In particular, Adefemi admitted that he had been convicted of a concealed weapon offense. Adefemi argues that under Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330, 1996 WL 230227 (B.I.A. 1996), his testimony cannot be considered because it is extrinsic evidence of the conviction. The issue in Pichardo-Sufren was whether an alien's testimony that he was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon constitutes clear and convincing proof of his deportability “where the identity of the weapon that he was convicted of possessing and the subdivision of the law under which he was convicted [could not] be ascertained from the conviction document that was offered into evidence.’’ Id. at 331 (emphasis added). Here, however, the City Court of Atlanta document identifies the weapon Adefemi was convicted of possessing and his testimony served to corroborate the document.

In a related argument, Adefemi contends that any reliance on his testimony is impermissible. That argument fails. When reviewing an administrative decision, we generally look at the entire record, and Adefemi's testimony is part of the record. Moreover, this court has previously held that an alien's testimony that he was convicted of a deportable offense can, in certain circumstances, constitute sufficient evidence to affirm the BIA’s determination that an alien is deportable. See Fequiere v. Ashcroft, 279 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2002). In any event, Adefemi’s testimony is unnecessary to decide this case because the City Court of Atlanta document provides sufficient evidence for us to affirm the BIA's decision.

Adefemi also argues that the City Court of Atlanta document does not provide sufficient evidence to affirm the BIA's decision because the document does not specify the particular subsection of Georgia law that Adefemi violated. The section under which Adefemi was charged, Ga.Code Ann. § 16-11-126, contains both firearm and nonfirearm offenses. Because of this fact, Adefemi argues that the document does not show that Adefemi was convicted of a firearms offense. See Pichar-do-Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 334 ("[A]bsent any reference in the Certificate of Disposition to the subdivision under which the respondent was convicted ... we do not find that the court document that was offered into the record establishes the respondent's deporta-bility for a firearms violation....”). Adefemi, however, ignores the second half of the quoted sentence, which, in full, states that "absent any reference in the Certificate of Disposition to the subdivision under which the respondent was convicted or the weapon that the respondent was convicted of possessing, we do not find [that the court document satisfies the clear and convincing evidence standard].” Id. (emphasis added). Here, unlike in Pichar-do-Sufren, the City Court of Atlanta document describes the weapon as a .22 caliber RG10-a firearm. No other weapon is listed. Thus, Adefemi’s argument is not persuasive.

.We have jurisdiction to review this decision because Adefemi was in deportation proceedings prior to April 1, 1997, and, therefore, the new jurisdictional rules regarding appellate review of the BIA's § 212(c) determination under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIR-IRA”) do not apply. Cunningham v. United States Attorney Gen., 335 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003) (''The 'general rule’ is that the 1996 amendments do not apply to aliens who are in deportation proceedings prior to April 1, 1997.”). We have jurisdiction over appeals of a denial of § 212(c) relief in deportation cases that began prior to the enaction of IIRI-RA. See id. at 1264-66; Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455 (11th Cir. 1994) (reaching the merits of whether an alien can receive § 212(c) relief when being deported as a result of a conviction for a firearms offense).

.We note that Adefemi also argued that he should receive discretionary relief under INA § 245(a). Adefemi, however, did not make this argument in the administrative forum and, therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to review this claim. Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1286 n. 14.In addition, because we affirm the BIA's decision that Adefemi is deportable and ineligible for § 212(c) relief as a result of the firearms conviction, we need not reach the BIA’s decisions regarding his deportability for the two thefts, or whether he was statutorily ineligible for § 212(c) relief because he could not meet the statutory residency requirement. Finally, Adefemi urges us to consider his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. Because we have considered all of the arguments presented in that petition, the petition is dismissed as moot. Farquharson, 246 F.3d at 1319 n. 2.