Sophia J. Gibbons brings this case to us for the third time. In Gibbons v. Twigg, 52 Fed.Appx. 492 (11th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (Gibbbons I), we affirmed the district court’s dismissal of her claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and remanded the case for a determination of whether the district court had diversity jurisdiction over her state law claims.

On remand, Gibbons moved the court to recuse, asserting that it showed bias and *292 prejudice towards her as a result of “several highly questionable and inconsistent rulings” entered against her during the course of the proceedings. The court denied her motion. On June 17, 2003, the court dismissed her state law claims for lack of diversity jurisdiction, finding that Regina Twigg, like Gibbons, was a resident of Florida. The court based its decision on affidavits filed by Twigg in which she indicated, among other things, that she had a Florida driver’s license until 1999, when she obtained a Georgia license, but that she renewed her Florida license on June 4, 2002. Gibbons appealed the court’s judgment, and we affirmed.

In Gibbons v. Twigg, 99 Fed.Appx. 886 (11th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (Gibbons II), we affirmed the district court’s decision dismissing appellant’s state law claims, but instructed the court to correct the docket sheet entry to indicate that the dismissal was without prejudice.

On January 19, 2005, Gibbons moved the district court pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) to set aside the order of dismissal (that was before us in Gibbons II). Because the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in federal civil cases and Gibbons was proceeding pro se, the court treated the motion as having been filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2) and (3). Those Rule 60(b) provisions authorize the district court to reheve a party from the judgment entered against it on grounds of newly discovered evidence or fraud and must be invoked within one year after the judgment is rendered. The court denied Gibbons’s motion as untimely. Gibbons now appeals, challenging that ruling and the court’s previous denial of her motion to recuse. We review both rulings for abuse of discretion.

Because Gibbons filed her motion to set aside the order of dismissal more than one year after the district court entered its judgment, the motion was untimely and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying it.

As for the recusal issue, it is obvious that Gibbons could have raised that issue in her appeal in Gibbons II, but she did not. Therefore, she has abandoned her claim that the district court should have recused. See Martin, 289 F.2d at 416-417 (disregarding argument made by appellant on second appeal when the argument could have been asserted in the first appeal); see also United States v. Fiallo-Jacome, 874 F.2d 1479, 1482 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that criminal defendant waived his right to raise issues on his second appeal that could have been raised during his first appeal).

AFFIRMED.