Hunter Demarick appeals his 188-month sentence imposed after a jury convicted him for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). On appeal, Demarick argues that, in light of the remedial holding of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.-, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the district court erred by applying the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory. Moreover, Demarick argues, the fact that the court sentenced him to the lowest possible sentence within the guideline range demonstrates that the Booker error was not harmless. According to Demarick, because the court erroneously believed that it was required to impose a sentence within the guideline range, rather than an alternative reasonable sentence, he is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

We note at the outset that because Demarick failed to raise his Booker argument before the district court, we review the district court’s decision for plain error. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2005) (No. 04-1148). Thus, we may exercise our discretion to correct a forfeited error only where the appellant establishes: “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights ..., but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

In order to prove that a particular error affected his substantial rights, the appellant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result would have been different but for the alleged error. Id. at 1299. “[Wjhere the effect of an error on the result in the district court is uncertain or indeterminate ... [the appellant] has not met his burden of showing that his substantial rights have been affected.” Id. at 1301 (citing Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 394-95, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 2105, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999)). The fact that a district court imposed a sentence at the low end of the guideline range does not, by itself, establish a reasonable probability *165 that it would have imposed a lesser sentence under an advisory guideline scheme. United States v. Fields, 408 F.3d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 2005).

We have explained that there are two possible types of Booker error: (1) the error of sentencing a defendant on the basis of facts not found by the jury nor admitted by the defendant, or “constitutional error”; and (2) the error of being sentenced under a mandatory guidelines scheme, or “statutory error.” See United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2005).

A. Sixth Amendment Error

In Booker, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding from Apprendi that, “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker, 543 U.S. at -, 125 S.Ct. at 756 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). Thus, when a defendant is sentenced on the basis of facts admitted by him, that sentence does not offend the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury.

In Shelton, we held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated because he had admitted the facts used to enhance his sentence by failing to object to the statements contained in the presentence investigation report (“PSI”). Shelton, 400 F.3d at 1330. Likewise, Demarick failed to object to the facts contained in the PSI. Therefore, he admitted the facts that support his sentence. As noted above, sentencing on the basis of admitted facts does not violate the Sixth Amendment, and therefore there is no Sixth Amendment error.

B. Statutory Error

Nonetheless, Demariek can establish statutory Booker error because the district court sentenced him under a mandatory guidelines scheme. Id. The decision in Booker made this error plain, thus satisfying the first two prongs of the plain error test. Id.

Despite this plain error, Demariek cannot prevail because he cannot demonstrate that his substantial rights were affected by the error. Demariek claims that the fact that he was sentenced on the low end of the sentencing range establishes a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different under an advisory guidelines scheme. As we held in Fields, this showing, without more, does not meet the defendant’s burden under the third prong of the plain error test. Therefore, there is no statutory Booker error.

For the foregoing reasons, and upon considered review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm Demariek’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.