Carolina Carvajal-Castaño petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA’s) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(1), 1231(b)(3). 1 Carvajal-Castaño, a member of the Conservative Party, the Association *924 of Artisans of Candió, and the Local Administrative Meetings, asserts her political activities caused her to be persecuted and threatened by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Carvajal-Castano contends neither the BIA nor the IJ placed sufficient weight on all of the encounters she had with FARC, which fell within the definition of past persecution. 2 Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision, and we deny the petition.

To the extent the BIA’s decision is based on a legal determination, review is de novo. Mohammed v. Ashcroft, 261 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2001). Factual determinations, however, are reviewed under the “highly deferential substantial evidence test,” which requires us to “view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the [BIA’s] decision and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1035, 125 S.Ct. 2245, 161 L.Ed.2d 1063 (2005). Findings of fact may be reversed only when the record compels the opposite conclusion. Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006).

A petitioner can establish asylum based on past persecution if she can demonstrate she was persecuted and the persecution resulted from a protected ground. Id. In establishing eligibility for asylum based on a well-founded' fear of future persecution, she must demonstrate both a “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable fear of persecution,” resulting from a protected ground. Id.

Here, the BIA denied asylum because there was insufficient evidence Carvajal-Castaño experienced persecution or had a well-founded fear of future persecution. The evidence does not compel a finding Carvajal-Castaño was persecuted, as her testimony was that she had been threatened, mostly by telephone, and recounted no physical contact except being pushed against a wall. “[Persecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation.” Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citation omitted). “[M]enacing telephone calls and threats ... do not rise to the level of past persecution that would compel reversal of the IJ’s decision.” Id. Thus, the incidents about which Carvajal-Castano testified do not rise to the level of past persecution.

Additionally, in a case where the petitioner had been subject to menacing telephone calls and threats, we noted the petitioner’s “notoriety” would not outlast a four-year absence, making her fear of future persecution objectively unreasonable. Id. at 1232. Similarly here, there is no evidence the FARC would still be interested in Carvajal-Castaño three years later. Thus, the evidence does not compel a finding Carvajal-Castaño has a well-founded fear of future persecution.

Withholding of removal may be granted if the alien can establish that, if returned to his country, his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). “ ‘Where an applicant is unable to meet the ‘well-founded fear’ standard for asylum, [she] is generally precluded from qualifying for either asylum or withholding of [removal].’ ” Silva, 448 F.3d *925 at 1243. As Carvajal-Castano failed to establish eligibility for asylum, she also failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal.

PETITION DENIED.