Daron D. Alexander appeals his 180-month sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). 1 Specifically, he argues the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) — which, in relevant part, requires a district court to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” — because it failed to state on the record that his sentence was “not greater than necessary.” We affirm.

The parties are familiar with the facts, and we do not recount them here. Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), § 3553(a) “ ‘remains in effect, and sets forth numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.’ ” United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 766). Although Booker directs district courts to consider the § 3553(a) factors, “nothing in Booker or elsewhere requires a district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, a statement that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient in post-Booker sentences. Id. at 1329.

After carefully reviewing the sentencing transcript, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant case law, we reject Alexander’s argument that the district court violated § 3553(a) by failing to state on the record that his sentence was “not greater than necessary.” At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated it considered the § 3553(a) factors and “the facts and circumstances surrounding this particular case” before imposing the mandatory statutory minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. As explained above, such statements alone are sufficient to support a post-Booker sentence. 2 We thus affirm Alexander’s 180-month sentence.

AFFIRMED.