Plaintiff Everett Brown appeals the district court’s order denying his verified motion for new trial, which he filed after the jury returned a verdict in favor of his former employer, Boston Market Corporation (“Boston Market”), on Brown’s claims alleging violations of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. § 760.91 et seq., based on race (black) and national origin (Jamaican) discrimination. On appeal, Brown argues the district court erred by denying his motion for new trial based on (1) Boston’s Market’s references, during opening statement and closing argument, to Brown’s prior lawsuits and claims against other former employers; (2) Boston Market’s cross-examination of Brown concerning a prior complaint against his former employer, Premier Cruise Lines, and the submission of the prior complaint, as Exhibit 31, to the jury despite that it was not offered into evidence; and (3) the introduction into evidence of Brown’s prior claim for worker’s compensation benefits against another former employer, Golden Corral. After careful review, we affirm. 1

We review a district court’s decision on a motion for new trial for abuse of discre *246 tion. See Lambert v. Fulton County, Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 595 (11th Cir. 2001). We accord significant weight to a district court’s exercise of its broad discretion in determining whether to set aside a jury verdict and grant a post-verdict new trial:

[t]he standard for determining whether a jury verdict should be set aside as a result of misconduct of counsel is whether the conduct was such as to impair gravely the calm and dispassionate consideration of the case by the jury. The trial judge is given broad discretion in controlling counsel’s arguments. Absent an abuse of discretion, the decision of the trial court, which has had the opportunity to hear the offensive remarks within the context of the argument and to view their effect on the jury, should not be disturbed.

BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467, 1474 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition to the high standard of review otherwise applicable here, Brown’s failure to raise his present arguments in a timely manner in the district court further limits the extent of our review. See generally Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331-33 (11th Cir. 2004).

From our review of the record, Brown had numerous opportunities in the district court to contemporaneously raise the objections and arguments he now forwards here. He repeatedly failed to do so. 2 Under similar procedural circumstances, we have held that we simply cannot, and will not, address such improperly preserved arguments for this first time on appeal:

This Court has repeatedly held that an issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered by this court. The reason for this prohibition is plain: as a court of appeals, we review claims of judicial error in the trial courts. If we were to regularly address questions' — particularly fact-bound issues— that districts court never had a chance to examine, we would not only waste our resources, but also deviate from the essential nature, purpose, and competence of an appellate court.

In Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 1998), we expressed our concern that “[t]oo often our eol *247 leagues on the district courts complain that the appellate cases about which they read were not the cases argued before them. We cannot allow Plaintiff to argue a different case from the case she presented to the district court.” Id. at 769. We share that concern. Plainly, as an appellate court with no fact finding mechanism, and, indeed, without any factual averments made in the trial court, we are naturally hesitant to consider this claim. We also observe that the plaintiffs had every opportunity to raise the new theory in district court, whether in their initial complaint or in an effort to amend their complaint.

Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted). 3

On this record, we will not address the litany of arguments Brown asserts, for the first time here, relating to Exhibit 31 and Boston Market’s arguments concerning his prior lawsuit against Premier Cruise Lines and prior worker’s compensation claim against Golden Corral. 4 Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment in favor of Boston Market.

AFFIRMED.