In this action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) & 2000e-3(a), as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a jury found for Fredric Kendrick against Broadcast Media Group, LLC (“BMG”) on his claims that BMG terminated his employment on account of his race and retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity, i.e., for complaining about BMG’s racially discriminatory employment practices, and awarded him $100,000 in compensatory damages, $30,000 in punitive damages, and $16,071 in back pay. 1 The court thereafter en *890 tered a final judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. 2 BMG now appeals.

BMG raises three issues in its brief: (1) whether the court erred in denying its pretrial motion for summary judgment on Kendrick’s discriminatory-termination claim; (2) whether the court “abused its discretion by concluding that on [Kendrick’s] retaliation claim there was sufficient evidence to establish pretext as to [BMG’s] legitimate non-diseriminatory reason for terminating [Kendrick]; and (3) whether [Kendrick] failed to present sufficient evidence of race discrimination to permit submission of the case to the jury.”

The first two issues address whether the court erred in denying BMG’s motion for summary judgment. The problem BMG faces seeking appellate review of these issues is that out precedent holds that “after a full trial and judgment on the merits, [we] will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment.” Akouri v. State of Florida Dept. Of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In short, this precedent precludes our review of the court’s summary judgment ruling. We turn, then, to BMG’s argument that the court erred in submitting the case to the jury, i.e., the claims that formed the bases for Kendrick’s recovery. 3

BMG moved the court for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiffs case. The court did not rule on the motion, and BMG proceeded to put on its own case. After it rested, BMG did not move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence. 4 In other words, it stood silent as the court submitted the case to the jury under instructions that are not challenged here. As Wright and Miller explain, “[i]t is thoroughly established that the sufficiency of the evidence is not reviewable on appeal unless a motion for judgment as a matter of law was made in the trial court. Indeed a motion at the close of the plaintiffs case will not do unless it is renewed at the close of all the evidence.” 9A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2536.

In sum, the law precludes us from reviewing the court’s denial of BMG’s motion for summary judgment and the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant submission of the case to the jury. 5 The court’s judgment is therefore due to be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.