The City of Huntsville, Alabama, hired Michele Watkins (who is black) as a part-time Court Clerk I in October 2000, but declined to hire her for a full-time Court Clerk I position that opened in June 2001. 1 Eight months after the City received Watkins’ EEOC racial discrimination charge, the City terminated her for poor work performance and for fading to disclose, on each of her job applications, that she had a prior conviction.

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. Assuming that Watkins met her burden of showing she was qualified for the job at issue, 2 she plainly did not meet her burden of showing the City’s reason for not hiring her was pretext. Further, Watkins did not meet her burden of showing a causal relationship between her termination and her filing of an EEOC charge.

As the City offered evidence that it hired the person it determined to be the best-qualified candidate, Watkins had the burden to show this stated reason is pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, (1973). She argues that she met this burden by showing that (a) the City had a policy of preference for an employee applicant whose qualifications are equal to an outside applicant, and (b) that she had some qualifications better than the selected candidate.

To infer pretext, “disparities in qualifications must be of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question.” Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). To raise a genuine issue of fact whether the City’s articulated reason that .it selected the best qualified candidate was pretextual, Watkins’ burden was to show that she “was so clearly more qualified for the position than [the selected candidate] that a reasonable juror could infer discriminatory intent from the comparison.” Id. Even in light of the City’s preference policy, Watkins’ evidence of her and the selected candidate’s qualifications would not permit a juror, comparing those qualifications, to draw this inference.

As to Watkins’ claim of retaliation, the district court did not err in concluding that the eight-month lapse between the City’s receipt of Watkins’ EEOC charge and her termination did not raise an infer *957 ence of a causal link. Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001) (three and one-half month temporal proximity, without more, is insufficient to create jury issue). Nor does a jury issue arise from the remaining evidence, or lack of evidence, upon which Watkins relies.

AFFIRMED.