Pablo Andres Angulo Hincapié appeals the 135-month sentence imposed by the district court upon re-sentencing. The record reflects that the district court properly considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in determining Hincapie’s sentence. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

A grand jury charged Hincapié with possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in violation of 46 Appx. U.S.C. §§ 1903(a), (g), 18 U.S.C. § 2, and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(l)(B)(ii), and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in violation of 46 Appx. U.S.C. §§ 1903(a), (g), (j), and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(l)(B)(ii). Hincapié had been a crew member on a boat to which the Coast Guard linked 133 bales of cocaine. The Coast Guard had also found evidence of cocaine on the crewmembers’ clothing. Hincapié pled guilty to the charges against him.

Hincapié had a base offense level of 38 because his offense involved 2,692 kilograms of cocaine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2003). He received a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(6) and a three-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. With a total offense level of 33 and criminal history category of I, the applicable guideline range was 135-168 months imprisonment. The district court sentenced Hincapié to 135 months. Hincapié appealed, and we affirmed his sentence in part, but vacated and remanded for re-sentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).

During the re-sentencing hearing, 1 Hincapié indicated that the only issue before the court was the determination of an appropriate sentence in light of the § 3553(a) factors. He argued that, after Booker, the court could consider specific offender characteristics it had not previously been able to consider in determining the sentence. He pointed out that (1) he was young, (2) *714 he had a limited education, (3) he had three daughters, (4) this was his first such offense, (5) he had no prior record, and (6) he took part in the scheme because he was having financial problems. He further asserted that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3661, there was no limit to the information the court could consider regarding his character and conduct.

The government urged the court to impose a sentence within the guideline range, and, in light of the nature of the offense, the amount of drugs involved, the need to sentence the defendant consistently and avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, the court should sentence Hincapié to 135 months. The court indicated that it had reviewed the PSI “consistent with an advisory guideline range, and consider[ed] the statutory sentencing factors set forth in 3553(a).” R4 at 14. The court observed that (1) Hincapié was being “held accountable for over 2600 kilograms of cocaine;” (2) the charged offense was “quite serious”; and (3) a “lengthy” sentence was “not only required, but appropriate to deter similar conduct.” Id. at 14-15. The court then sentenced Hincapié to 135 months in prison.

On appeal, Hincapié argues that the district court did not appropriately consider the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in determining his sentence. He also contends that the court failed to consider the factors set out in chapter 5H of the sentencing guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3661. 2

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s interpretation of the guidelines de novo and “a defendant’s ultimate sentence for reasonableness.” United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). In imposing a sentence after Booker, a court must first consult the guidelines and correctly calculate the guideline range. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). The court must then consider the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which include:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need [for the sentence] to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims.

Talley, 431 F.3d at 786 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). The district court need not explicitly discuss each factor. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). “[Ajcknowledgment by the district court that it has considered the defendant’s arguments and the factors in section 3553(a) is sufficient under Booker.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 786.

Here, the record reflects that the district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors in determining Hincapie’s sentence. The court not only ac *715 knowledged that it had considered the factors, but it also specifically noted its belief that, in light of the nature of the offense, which it described as “quite serious,” a lengthy sentence was “appropriate to deter similar conduct.” R4 at 14-15. Accordingly, we find no error.

III. CONCLUSION

Hincapié appeals the 135-month sentence imposed by the district court upon post-Booker re-sentencing. Because we conclude that the district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors in determining Hineapie’s sentence, we AFFIRM.