Rafael Guerrero-Bermudez, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) adopting the order of the immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his application for a waiver of inadmissibility under the former INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). 1 No reversible error has been shown; we deny the petition.

*905 The parties disagree about whether we have jurisdiction over this case. “We review subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003). We do have jurisdiction to hear Guerrero-Bermudez’s claims on appeal because they are constitutional or present a question of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D) (removing our jurisdiction to review a final removal order against an alien convicted of certain criminal offenses unless the petitioner raises a constitutional question or a question of law).

In this case, we review the decisions of the IJ and the BIA. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that we review the BIA’s decision; but “[ijnsofar as the [BIA] adopts the IJ’s reasoning, we will review the IJ’s decision as well”). In addition, we review the denial of § 212(c) relief for abuse of discretion. Ramsey v. INS, 55 F.3d 580, 582 (11th Cir. 1995).

Guerrero-Bermudez raises three constitutional claims. 2 First, he argues that the IJ’s conclusion that he was ineligible for a discretionary § 212(c) waiver because he had received such relief previously was erroneous and deprived him of substantive due process. “The analysis of any claim to a substantive due process right should begin with ‘a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.’” Tinker v. Beasley, 429 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997)). We have concluded “that the failure to receive discretionary relief in the immigration context does not deprive an alien of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.” Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1300 (11th Cir. 1999). Because “an alien has no constitutionally-protected right to discretionary relief or to be eligible for discretionary relief,” and because the IJ denied Guerrero-Bermudez a § 212(c) waiver as a matter of discretion, his due process claim fails. Oguejiofor v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 277 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002).

Guerrero-Bermudez next argues that the IJ’s decision denying him a § 212(c) waiver violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Again, the IJ’s decision denying Guerrero-Bermudez a § 212(c) waiver was discretionary; and we discern no equal protection violation in this case.

Finally, Guerrero-Bermudez argues that the IJ committed a double jeopardy violation in not dismissing violations *906 of the law listed in this notice to appear because these violations already had been adjudicated. Because we have concluded that “the double jeopardy clause applies only to proceedings that are essentially criminal and deportation is purely civil,” we reject Guerrero-Bermudez’s double jeopardy claim. Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1196 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted).

PETITION DENIED.