. We are very sympathetic with the attorney’s plight under the unique circumstances created by a remand judgment under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Our understanding is the amount of fees owed under a contingency arrangement is not established for months after remand, until the Social Security Administration determines the amount of the client's award. In Bergen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006), we suggested the best practice for avoiding confusion about the integration of Fed.RXiv.P. 54(d)(2)(B) into the procedural framework of a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 406 is for a plaintiff to request and the district court to include in the remand judgment a statement that attorneys fees may be applied for within a specified time after the determination of the plaintiff’s past due benefits by the Commission. 454 F.3d at 1278 n. 2. As we understand it, however, the best practice has not been a universally-workable solution. Perhaps another vehicle for creating some much needed certainty in this area of the law is for the district courts to fashion a general order or a local rule permitting district-wide application of a universal process for seeking fees under these unique circumstance. It is our hope the district courts, in doing so, will keep in mind Congress’s intent behind § 406(b), to encourage attorneys to represent Social Security claimants. See Bergen, 454 F.3d at 1276.