Kelvin Ranee, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his two-count complaint against Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., based upon negligence and a violation of the Fan' Labor Standards Act (FLSA). On appeal, Ranee argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim, and that the district erred in granting Rocksolid’s motion to dismiss pri- or to sua sponte providing Ranee an opportunity to amend his complaint. We affirm the ruling of the district court.

We review the district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion de novo. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Corp, of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 1986). Moreover, “[pjro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court may consider the complaint and all exhibits attached thereto. Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006).

We begin by considering Ranee’s FLSA claim. Ranee’s complaint alleges that he did not receive wages due to him for a portion of one day’s work that he performed for Granite Transformations, an allegedly fictitious corporation owned by Rocksolid. He argues that this violates FLSA’s minimum wage requirements under 29 U.S.C.A. § 206.

To establish a prima facie case of an FLSA violation, Ranee must show “as a matter of just and reasonable inference” the amount and extent of his work in order to demonstrate that he was inadequately compensated under FLSA. See Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, 993 F.2d 1500, 1513 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 475 n. 12 (11th Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-87, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946).) Ranee has failed to do so because his complaint and attached documentation provide no evidence of the amount and extent of his work.

Moreover, attached to his complaint is an email that Ranee sent to his supervisor, Frank Baran of Granite Transformations, in which Ranee inquired, “When will I get paid for the work done at the Miami location on or about March 28, 2007?” Baran responded, via email, “How many hours did you end up working that day? Let me know and I will get a check out.” Ranee does not claim that he ever responded to Baran’s email message. In light of this email correspondence with Baran, Ranee has failed to demonstrate that any inadequate compensation was a result of Rock-solid’s actions, rather than his own. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Ranee’s FLSA claim.

*3 Ranee’s complaint also alleges that he was injured while working for Granite Transformations that day. Ranee’s allegation that Rocksolid is liable for negligence due to his injuries can be construed in two ways. First, Ranee’s complaint can be read to allege a Workman’s Compensation claim on the grounds that “Defendant breached its duty of keeping its workplace safe.” (D. Ct. Order at 4 n. 3) The district court found, however, that Ranee’s “appropriate avenue for this claim” would be to pursue a remedy under Florida’s Worker’s Compensation laws. Id. It is fully within the district court’s discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, and given our finding that the district court did not err in dismissing Ranee’s FLSA claim, we find no error in the district court’s implicit decision not to do so. 1 Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004).

Second, Ranee’s complaint can be read to allege that Rocksolid’s negligence is due to its failure to provide Ranee with worker’s compensation insurance information, and its refusal to pay for medical bills or any other damages sustained as a result of Ranee’s on-the-job injury. However, Ranee’s exhibits again directly undermine his claim. Attached to the complaint is an email Ranee wrote to his supervisor, Frank Baran of Granite Transformations, in which he informed Baran, “I was injured on your job yesterday in Miami.” Baran responded, “Kelvin, I was not aware please send me the details of what happened.” Ranee did not respond to Baran and accordingly, he cannot not now claim that Rocksolid failed to comply with requests which Ranee has failed to demonstrate that he ever made. We find no error in the district court’s dismissal of Ranee’s negligence claim.

Finally, Ranee argues that the district court erred by granting Rocksolid’s motion to dismiss without sva spoute providing Ranee with an opportunity to amend his complaint. Ranee has not indicated, however, how he would have amended the complaint to overcome its deficiencies had he been given the opportunity. We therefore conclude that stta, spoute granting Ranee an opportunity to amend his complaint would have been futile. See Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004); Hardy v. Broward Co. Sheriff’s Office, 238 Fed.Appx. 435, 443 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case without prejudice.

AFFIRMED.