William Santacrose, who suffers from a back injury that generally prevents him from sitting for more than eight consecutive hours, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for his employer, CSX Transportation (CSX), on his claims of disability discrimination and retaliation, brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, and Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701. After carefully reviewing the rec- , ,. ord, considermg briefing from the parties, and for ^ reasong ^ f()llow> we affirm.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lowe v. Ala. Power Co., 244 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure *657 materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is enti-tied to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

II

Discrimination actions brought under the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same standards used in ADA cases. Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the ADA, Santaerose must show (1) he has a disability; (2) he is a “qualified individual,” which is to say, able to perform the essential functions of the employment position with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) CSX discriminated against him because of his disability. Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1061 (11th Cir. 2000). With regard to the third prong, a qualified individual is discriminated against when his employer fails to reasonably accommodate his disability. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005).

tt a . .. . . Until August 2004, CSX’s medical de- , , , . - , . partment had approved a work restriction t. _ , , , . , , lor Santaerose under which he was not . . , , , . , , required to work more than eight hours , , , ,, . per day unless he felt capable of domg so. ; , , ,, f , In response to a letter from Santaerose s medical provider requesting that CSX renew the work restriction, CSX notified Santaerose it could no longer allow the requested restriction. From the end of August 2004 until September 2005, Santac-rose did not work any overtime that he had not volunteered to work, and when he was unable to work required overtime, he excused himself by taking unpaid sick leave. In September 2005, CSX approved Santaerose for intermittent FMLA leave, which he has since used when he has been incapable of working required overtime,

As the district court correctly eon-eluded, CSX reasonably accommodated Santacrose’s disability by allowing him to use his company sick leave and FMLA leave to avoid working overtime shifts. While Santaerose was not given the precise accommodation he requested (an eight-hour restriction), a qualified individua^ a disability is not entitled to the accommodation of his choice, but only to a reasonable accommodation. Stewari v. Happy Herman s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., F17 1278, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1997). Though Santaerose wanted to avoid overbme without having to use his company ^eave or FMLA leave, CSX was not obligated to fulfill this specific request, so ^onS as T provided him with a reasonable accommodation. Santacrose’s own testimony indicated he was allowed to avoid working overtime and maintain an eightbour restriction by using his leave. Nei^her Santacrose’s company sick leave nor b*s FMLA leave has been wholly diminished by his using leave time to excuse him‘ self from overtime. Moreover, Santaerose has never been disciplined for failing to work overtime shifts or using his leave time m lieu of working overtime. Because CSX s accommodation oí Santaerose s disability is reasonable, the district court did not err m grantmg summary mdgment to ° CSX as to Santaeroses discrimination claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation ^

Santaerose contends CSX never moved for summary judgment on his retaliation claim and the district court did not rule substantively on the claim, despite its grant of summary judgment as to all of his claims. Because the record supports the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Santacrose’s retaliation claim, we find no error. Santaerose claims CSX *658 has retaliated against him for his requesting an accommodation by continually failing to reasonably accommodate him. This retaliation claim fails because it merely reclothes Santacrose’s ADA discrimination claim, which we have already rejected, See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001). To the extent Santacrose alleges some other adverse employment action was taken in retaliation for his requesting an accommodation, his retaliation claim still fails due to his testimony that he suffered no tangible, negative effect on his employment as a & result of his accommodation request, but instead was simply “stressed out” because he did not want to use his FMLA leave. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to CSX on Santacrose’s retaliation claim.

AFFIRMED.