In April 2006, appellant Marcell Nor-darse applied for marine insurance from appellee Markel American Insurance Company (Markel), attesting that the purchase price and current value of the vessel to be insured was $180,000. 1 Based on Nor-darse’s assertions made on the application, Markel issued an insurance policy for Nor-darse’s vessel, with coverage beginning May 4, 2006.

On July 30, 2006, the vessel was stolen. 2 Nordarse filed a claim for loss with Mark-el.

*853 Actually, the purchase price of the vessel was, at most, $126,000. A bill of sale produced during discovery indicated that the purchase price of the vessel was $107,000. 3

During the adjustment process, Markel learned of the four alleged misrepresentations in the application, voided the policy ab initio and refunded all premiums. It then filed a petition for declaratory judgment and moved for summary judgment.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Markel. Nordarse appeals. There being no substantial disputes as to the facts or the law, we conclude the case without oral argument and affirm.

In granting summary judgment to Markel, the district court relied on the marine insurance doctrine of uberrimae fidei as the controlling law of this circuit. See HIH Marine Servs. v. Fraser, 211 F.3d 1359, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000) (an insured must fully and voluntarily disclose to the insurer all material facts necessary in calculating the scope of the insurance risk assumed). A material misrepresentation on the marine insurance application is grounds for voiding the policy. Id. at 1363.

The material facts are not in dispute. Nordarse represented the purchase price of the vessel on Markel’s marine insurance application to be $180,000. However, as Nordarse conceded during his deposition, he paid, at most, $126,000 for the vessel. 4 Without citing authority of any kind, Nor-darse merely argues that these facts are not material. On the other hand, Markel argues that other circuits have held that a vessel’s purchase price is unquestionably a fact material to the marine insurance risk to be assumed. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters At Lloyd’s v. Montford, 52 F.3d 219, 222 (9th Cir. 1995).

The district court found that undisputed evidence indicated that the purchase price of the vessel was a material factor in Markel’s underwriting decision to accept the risk of insuring the vessel. As Markel did not have an actual bill of sale at the time it made its decision, it relied on Nordarse’s written representation on the application, that the purchase price and current value of the vessel was $180,000. The district court concluded that Markel was entitled to void the policy ab Lbitio. See, e.g., HIH Marine Servs., 211 F.3d at 1364. 5

We agree. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.