Judy Copeland appeals pro se the dismissal of her complaint against the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. 5 U.S.C. § 704. The district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of the Department that a public housing authority took “appropriate actions” when it terminated Copeland’s benefits under Section 8 of the Housing Choice Voucher Program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a). We affirm.

The district court did not err by dismissing Copeland’s complaint. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a district court may not review the decision of an agency if “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). A decision is “committed to agency discretion” and barred from judicial review if the governing statute “is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1655, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). The Supreme Court has stated that there is no “procedure by which tenants c[an] complain to [the Department] about the alleged failures of [public housing authorities] to abide by ... HUD regulations.” Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 426, 107 S.Ct. 766, 772, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987). Because the district court had no meaningful standard to apply, the decision of the Department was immune from review.

The dismissal of Copeland’s complaint is AFFIRMED.