Bridgette Burgin, proceeding pro se, sued Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins, alleging copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. Burgin contends two books the defendants co-authored, The Regime and The Rising, infringed the copyright Burgin holds in her unpublished manuscript, The Final Call. The district court granted summary judgment in LaHaye’s and Jenkins’s favor, and Burgin appeals. Burgin, again proceeding pro se, argues that the district court erred because (1) she showed the defendants had access to The Final Call, (2) she showed The Regime and The Rising were substantially similar to The Final Call, and (3) the defendants failed to prove they independently created their works. After carefully considering the record and liberally construing Burgin’s pro se brief, 1 we affirm.

The district court did not err by granting summary judgment in LaHaye’s and *466 Jenkins’s favor. 2 In setting out her prima facie case of copyright infringement, Bur-gin was required to show that (1) she owns a valid copyright in The Final Call, 3 and (2) the defendants copied protected elements of The Final Call. 4 See Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2010). Because Burgin has not identified any direct proof that either LaHaye or Jenkins copied her work, she must establish this element of her prima facie case with circumstantial evidence. See Peter Letterese and Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008). Bur-gin seeks to carry this burden by showing first that LaHaye and Jenkins had access to The Final Call and second that there is a “probative similarity” between her work and theirs. 5 See id. at 1301.

Here, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Burgin, she has not shown that either of the defendants had access to her work, and thus has not established an inference of copying. Bur-gin has not demonstrated that either LaHaye or Jenkins ever had a reasonable opportunity to view a manuscript of The Final Call. See Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Access requires proof of a reasonable opportunity to view the work in question.” (quotation omitted).). The evidence shows that neither LaHaye nor Jenkins was affiliated with the Peter Taylor Prize writing competition, to which Burgin submitted her work. That Jenkins may or may not have corresponded with one of the Peter Taylor Prize judges regarding an entirely separate matter does not establish a reasonable opportunity for Jenkins to have viewed Burgin’s original work. To consider this flimsy “evidence” sufficient to establish access would be entirely speculative. See Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[A] finding of access in this ease would be based on speculation or conjecture, and this is impermissible.”).

Burgin also asserts that submission of a portion of her work to a Writer’s Digest writing competition was sufficient to show access. 6 The evidence shows that LaHaye *467 has never had any connection to the Writer’s Digest prize, and, although Jenkins was a judge for the competition, Burgin has not shown that he had a reasonable opportunity to view the work. Burgin submitted her writing in the competition categories of romance, thriller and suspense, and science-fiction/fantasy; Jenkins judged only the Inspirational Writing (Spiritual/Religious) category. Burgin’s work never progressed past the first round of the competition; Jenkins judged only the second round. Moreover, the evidence shows that the many manuscripts that were not chosen to progress to the second round were set to be destroyed. A mere allegation that Jenkins was affiliated with the same large writing competition to which Burgin submitted her work is not enough to establish access. Concluding that Jenkins may have seen Burgin’s work although he judged a different category and a different round would be impermis-sibly speculative. See Ferguson 584 F.2d at 113. 7

Moreover, even if Burgin could show that the defendants had access to her work and that the works were probatively similar, such circumstantial proof raises only a presumption of copying, which LaHaye and Jenkins could rebut with evidence of independent creation. See Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002). Here, the defendants testified in detail regarding their collaborative creative process for composing the two works in question, and both have maintained that they had never seen or read Burgin’s manuscript. See id. at 1233 (“[The defendant] can fully negate any claim of infringement if he can prove that he independently created [the work in question].”) Burgin has offered no evidence to refute this testimony. See id. (“Once [the defendant] offers evidence of independent creation, [the plaintiff] has the burden of proving that [the defendant] in fact copied [the work in question].”). This evidence of independent creation further detracts from Burgin’s claim of infringement. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in LaHaye’s and Jenkins’s favor.

AFFIRMED.