Blue Bird Corporation (“Blue Bird”) appeals from a final judgment entered following a non-jury trial in which the district court determined that Blue Bird unlawfully fired its employee Ricky Dye in retaliation for raising safety concerns about a job assignment in violation of section 11(c)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (“OSH Act”). 1 That Act seeks to insure “safe and healthful working conditions” for employees “by encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the number of occupational safety and health hazards at their places of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). To that end, § 11(c)(1) of the OSH Act provides that

No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint ... or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter.

29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (emphasis added).

The district court, based on its factual findings, concluded that the Secretary of Labor had established its prima facie case of retaliatory discharge and that Blue Bird’s proffered reasons for the discharge were merely pretextual. 2 We review a district court’s factual findings following a non-jury trial, including a finding of intentional discrimination, for clear error. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). “If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, [we] may not reverse it even though [we are] convinced that had [we] been sitting as the trier of fact, [we] would have weighed the evidence differently.” Id. at 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504. This is true even “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence.” Id. at 574,105 S.Ct. 1504.

The district court’s factual findings are supported in the record, and we cannot say that it clearly erred.

AFFIRMED.