Citizens and nationals of Colombia, Federico Ochoa-Moncada, Ana Isabel Restrepo, and their three children petition pro se for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying their motion, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) and (c), to reopen their removal proceedings. Although conceding that their motion to reopen was untimely, the petitioners argue that they received ineffective assistance of counsel during their removal hearing, that the 90-day filing deadline should have been equitably tolled, and that the case should be reopened to allow Restrepo to testify in support of her own asylum application and to establish her own credibility.

We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen. 443 F.3d 804, 808 (11th Cir. 2006). This review “is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (citations omitted). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

An alien may file one motion to reopen in removal proceedings before the BIA. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (c). A motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). Further, “[a] motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This 90-day requirement is “mandatory and jurisdictional, and, therefore, it is not subject to equitable tolling.” Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1150 (11th Cir. 2005).

The petitioners moved to reopen their removal proceedings on June 4, 2010, more than 90 days after the BIA’s January 22, 2009 order affirming the IJ’s denial of all relief. Because the petitioners concede that the motion was untimely, and because *731 the 90-day deadline is not subject to equitable tolling, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen. Because the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen, we deny the petition for review.

PETITION DENIED IN PART, DISMISSED 1 IN PART.