Raymond Brown appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against the defendants, in which he alleges that the defendants unlawfully made him register as, and published in a newspaper that he was, a sex offender based on his prior criminal conviction for aggravated child molestation. Brown argues that the state failed to prove venue at his underlying criminal trial, rendering his conviction invalid, and that the defendants violated his due process rights when they did not investigate the validity of his underlying conviction before classifying him as a sex offender.

The district court found that Brown’s § 1983 claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that when judgment in favor of a plaintiff seeking damages in a § 1983 suit “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiffs] conviction or sentence,” the “plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. In other words, “the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364.

A judgment in favor of Brown on his § 1983 claim would necessarily imply the *795 invalidity of his underlying conviction for aggravated child molestation. Because Brown has not provided any evidence that this conviction has already been invalidated, the district court did not err in finding his claims barred by Heck. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.