This is an appeal from the district court’s order denying defendant Jim Over-ton’s (“Overton”) motion to dismiss based on judicial immunity. 1 We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss. See Muldrow v. Davis, 433 Fed.Appx. 888, 890 (11th Cir. 2011) (qualified immunity content).

Plaintiffs in this case are all owners of real property in Duval County, Florida. In their complaint, plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and supplemental relief due to Overton’s placement of a public notation on their property records that their properties had or might contain hazardous substances. According to Overton, he was sued in this action because he complied with the requirements of a consent decree; 2 therefore, he contends he is *864 entitled to judicial immunity. The district court found that this assertion was misplaced. While non-judicial officers are entitled to “absolute immunity when their official duties ‘have an integral relationship with the judicial process,’ ” Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980)), that immunity only attaches when the officials are acting “within the scope of their authority.” Id. In this matter, plaintiffs allege that Over-ton acted outside and beyond the bounds of the consent decree when he placed the notation on the plaintiffs’ property records. The district court agreed with that argument and so do we.

The consent decree does not require Overton to take any action. The only parties bound by the consent decree are the United States and the settling defendant, the consolidated City of Jacksonville as a county and political subdivision of the State of Florida, its successors and assigns. The pertinent language of the consent decree states that the City of Jacksonville “shall satisfy this requirement through ordinances (1) directing the Duval County property appraiser to annotate the property record cards of all properties located within the site boundaries that there are or may be hazardous substances on the property; ...” R.2, Exh. B at p. 16, ¶ 27(1). There is no enacted ordinance authorizing the property appraiser (Over-ton) to place a notation on the information for the affected properties. R.2, ¶ 17. Because the consent decree did not order Overton to take any action, he was not charged with its enforcement. Moreover, we conclude that the act of tagging the plaintiffs’ properties with the notation was not integral to the judicial process. See Roland, 19 F.3d at 555. Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s finding that Overton was not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity and therefore affirm its order denying Overton’s motion to dismiss.

AFFIRMED.