After a guilty plea, Sedrick Lavon To-wells appeals his 120-month sentence for possession of five grams or more of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). After review, we conclude that Towells’s sentence is directly impacted by Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012), and that Towells preserved the Dorsey issue in the district court and in this direct appeal. Therefore, we vacate Towells’s sentence and remand to the district court for resen-tencing.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 1, 2009, police in Gadsden, Alabama, observed Defendant Towells leave his vehicle, enter another car, and exit that car to go to a nearby house. Police ordered Towells to stop and observed Towells throw a clear plastic bag over a house as he walked away. Police recovered the plastic bag, which appeared to contain crack cocaine, and arrested To-wells.

Forensic analysis showed that the plastic bag contained 20.36 grams of crack cocaine. On September 29, 2010, Towells pled guilty to one count of possessing five grams or more of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).

A. Presentence Investigation Report

Towells’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”) assigned a base offense level of 22 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(9). The PSI recommended a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a one-level reduction for providing complete information about his involvement in the offense or timely notifying authorities of his intent to plead guilty, which together resulted in a total adjusted offense level of 19. The PSI assigned Towells a criminal history category of III, which yielded an advisory guidelines range of 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment.

Prior to Towells’s plea, the government filed a notice claiming that Towells had been convicted of a felony “Violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act.” 1 The government alleged that this crime was a “prior conviction for a drug felony offense” under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) that triggered that statute’s 10-year mandatory minimum sentence for persons convicted of possessing five grams or more of crack cocaine. 2 Accordingly, the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years became Towells’s guidelines sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (“Where the statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guide *352 line range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”)-

B. Fair Sentencing Act Objection

Towells did not object to any of the facts alleged in the PSI, including his prior Georgia felony drug conviction. At his January 2011 sentencing hearing, Towells argued that the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) applied to his sentence. Towells committed this federal crime in November 2009, before the FSA was enacted, on August 8, 2010. Towells argued that the FSA still applied.

The FSA raised from five to 28 grams the threshold amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence under § 841(b)(1)(B). Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub.L. No. 111-220 § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2872 (2010). To-wells pled guilty to possessing only 20.36 grams of crack cocaine. Thus, if the FSA applied, Towells would not be subject to the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Rather, Towells would be subject to his advisory guidelines range of 27 to 46 months’ imprisonment.

The district court declined to apply the FSA-amended penalty provisions and sentenced Towells to 120 months’ imprisonment. The United States Supreme Court recently held that the FSA’s “more lenient penalty provisions apply to offenders who committed a crack cocaine crime before August 3, 2010, but were not sentenced until after August 3.” Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2326, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012). We therefore vacate Towells’s sentence and remand for the limited purpose of resentencing in light of Dorsey.

VACATED AND REMANDED.