Gilberto Maldonado-Avila appeals his 50-month sentence, imposed after pleading guilty to one count of reentry of a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). On appeal, Maldonado-Avila argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

However, Maldonado-Avila has not met his burden of showing that his 50-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. First, his sentence is in the middle of the advisory guidelines range of 46 to 57 months and well below the 20-year statutory maximum penalty. The sentence, moreover, met the goals encompassed within 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In particular, the district court focused on Maldonado-Avila’s criminal history and background, which included prior convictions for DUI (on three separate occasions), giving a false name to a police officer, possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense. The district court also relied on the need to deter Maldonado-Avila and other convicted felons from illegally reentering the United States, which is an appropriate consideration under § 3553(a). The district court acknowledged Maldonado-Avila’s testimony that he had faced harassment, threats, and assaults from the Federal Police in Mexico, who mistakenly believed he was a member of a drug cartel. The district court concluded, nevertheless, that Maldonado-Avila returned to the United States with full knowledge that he could be punished for reentering the country without permission and that Maldonado-Avila’s reentry offense was serious in light of his criminal background, and accordingly, a guidelines sentence was reasonable.

Maldonado-Avila’s arguments that the district court did not appropriately consider his mitigating evidence, overrepresented his criminal history, and inappropriately considered general deterrence all *891 represent an overarching contention that the district court inappropriately weighed the § 3553(a) factors. The weight given to any one § 3553(a) factor, however, is within the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). Because the sentence was supported by the § 3553(a) factors, the district court did not commit a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors, and did not abuse its discretion.

AFFIRMED.