Norris Lundy, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction, pursuant to Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, Lundy asserts that he is eligible for a sentence reduction because the district court based his sentence on a framework that Amendment 750 retroactively changed.

We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the scope of its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2008). In liberally construing pro se pleadings, we hold pro se litigants to a less stringent standard. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

We have held that § 3582(c)(2) only provides a district court with the discretion to reduce a sentence that was based on a sentencing range that has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. See Moore, 541 F.3d at 1327. Section 3582(c)(2) does not provide a basis for a de novo resen-tencing. United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2000). If a defendant is a career offender, his base offense level is generally determined under the career-offender guideline in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and not the drug-quantity guideline in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. See Moore, 541 F.3d at 1327-28. As such, a retroactive amendment to the drug quantity table at § 2D1.1 does not have the effect of lowering the career-offender-based guideline range within the meaning of § 3582(c)(2), and the district courts are not authorized to reduce a sentence on that basis. See id.

The district court properly denied Lun-dy’s § 3582(c)(2) request because he was sentenced as a career offender. Amendment 750 did not lower his applicable guideline range.

AFFIRMED.