The government appeals Willie Dixon’s 27-month sentence, imposed after he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court held that Dixon’s prior conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling under Fla. Stat. § 810.02(3)(b) was not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) and thus could not be used to calculate Dixon’s base level offense under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. The government challenges this finding, asserting Dixon’s burglary conviction is a crime of violence under the “residual clause” of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). In response, Dixon argues the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and, even if the clause is constitutional, the conviction is not a crime of violence under the clause.

We recently addressed this exact issue in United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015). Matchett held the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) is constitutional and that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling under Fla. Stat. § 810.02(3)(b) falls within the scope of the clause. 1 Matchett, 802 F.3d at 1195-97. *893 Accordingly, the district court erred in finding Dixon’s burglary conviction was not a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). We therefore vacate Dixon’s sentence and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED.