Keyonbie Nashamba Humphrey appeals his 120-month sentence, imposed below his advisory guidelines range, 1 after pleading guilty to a single count of possessing with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base and a detectable amount of marijuana.

On appeal, Humphrey argues that the district court erred in determining that his two prior drug convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1) qualified him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.l(a). 2 Although he concedes that this Court previously determined, in United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2827, 192 L.Ed.2d 864 (2015), that a violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1) qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender enhancement, Humphrey argues, for the purpose of preserving his appellate rights, that Smith was incorrect. 3

We review de novo the district court’s decision to classify a defendant as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. United States v. Gibson, 434 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006). This Court is “bound to follow a prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this court en bane or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).

A defendant is a career offender if, inter alia, he has at least two prior felony convictions for a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.l(a). A “controlled substance offense” is “an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that *725 prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Id. § 4B1.2(b).

Under Florida law, it is a crime to “sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture,'or deliver, a controlled substance.” Fla. Stat. § 893.13(l)(a). Where the offense involves cocaine, it is a second-degree felony and carries a 15-year maximum term of imprisonment. Id. § 893.13(l)(a)(l), cross-referencing id. §§ 775.082(3)(d), 893.03(2)(a)(4). In 2002, the Florida legislature eliminated knowledge of the illicit nature of a substance as an element of controlled substance offenses under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1). Id. § 893.101(2). Subsequently, this Court has determined that a prior conviction under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1) is a “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) and, therefore, qualifies as a predicate felony for the purposes of the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.l(a). Smith, 775 F.3d at 1267-68. “No element of mens rea with respect to the illicit nature of the controlled substance is expressed or implied” in the Guidelines’ definition of a controlled substance offense. Id. at 1267.

The district court did not err in determining that Humphrey’s prior convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1) were controlled substance offenses for purposes of the career offender enhancement. See id. at 1267-68. As Humphrey concedes, his argument on appeal is foreclosed by our decision in Smith.

AFFIRMED.