Courtney Garner appeals his conviction and his 180-month sentence, imposed after Garner pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). Garner’s sentence was enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based in pertinent part on his two prior Florida convictions for fleeing or attempting to elude, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.1935. We affirm Garner’s conviction and vacate Garner’s sentence and remand for resen-tencing.

Garner first challenges the constitutionality of his conviction under section 922(g)(1). Garner contends that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional because regulation of the mere possession of a gun exceeds Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause. Gamer also argues that section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because his intrastate possession of a gun manufactured *881 out-of-state had no substantial effect on interstate commerce. As Garner concedes, however, his arguments are foreclosed squarely by this Court’s binding precedent. See, e.g,, United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, we affirm Garner’s conviction.

About his sentence, Garner argues— based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) — that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under the ACCA. Because Gamer raised no objection to the constitutionality of the ACCA’s residual clause in the district court, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Aguillard, 217 F.3d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000).

Under the law of the circuit in existence when Garner was sentenced, a felony conviction under Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(2) qualified as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s residual clause. See United States v. Petite, 703 F.3d 1290, 1301 (11th Cir. 2013). In Johnson, however, the Supreme Court struck down, as unconstitutionally vague, the residual clause of the ACCA. 135 S.Ct. at 2557-58.

Thus, after Johnson, Garner’s convictions for fleeing or attempting to elude may serve as predicate offenses under the ACCA only if they qualify as violent felonies under a different ACCA provision. But Fla. Stat. § 316.1935 does not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical fore 3 against the person of another,” are not “burglary, arson, or extortion,” and does not involve the “use of explosives.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii); see also Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 2273, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (concluding, under the categorical approach, that an Indiana conviction for “[r]esisting law enforcement through felonious vehicle flight” failed to qualify under either the ACCA’s elements clause or enumerated offenses clause), overruled on other grounds hy Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2551; Petite, 703 F.3d at 1293.

We conclude — and the government concedes — that Garner’s Florida convictions for fleeing or attempting to elude no longer qualify as violent- felonies under the ACCA. As a result, Garner’s remaining two qualifying predicate convictions for serious drug offenses are insufficient to sustain Garner’s ACCA status. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (requiring three predicate convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense to trigger ACCA enhancement).

In the light of our decision in United States v. Jones, 743 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 2014), and in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, the district court’s application of an ACCA enhancement to Garner’s sentence constituted plain error. We vacate Garner’s sentence and remand for resentencing. *

*882 CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED.