Quacy Tom Wright appeals his 48-month sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. Wright argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable. After review, 1 we affirm the district court.

After considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), and (a)(4)-(7), a district court may revoke a term of supervised release and impose a sentence of imprisonment if it “finds by a preponderance, of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3683(e)(3). The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a), including the need to deter criminal conduct and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C). In imposing a sentence, the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the applicable guide *756 line range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (4)-(7).

The concerns articulated by the district court in imposing Wright’s above-guideline sentence 2 —i.e., Wright’s criminal history, past supervised release violation, and drug and firearm violations—show the upward variance was not unreasonable. In light of Wright’s recidivism and criminal activity—including possession of marijuana and a firearm—an upward variance was appropriate to reflect his history and characteristics, to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense, and to achieve specific and general deterrence. See id. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B). Additionally, Wright’s arguments concerning his supportive family and mental health aré unavailing, as the court specifically addressed the importance of Wright’s family and noted that Wright was intelligent and functional. Because Wright’s 48-month sentence was within the “range of reasonable sentences from which the district court [could] choose,” see United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005), the district court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.