USCA11 Case: 21-10342 Date Filed: 11/29/2021 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 21-10342 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus HUGO VALENCIA MENDOZA, a.k.a. Uriel Valencia Mendoza, a.k.a. Yiyo,

Defendant-Appellant. USCA11 Case: 21-10342 Date Filed: 11/29/2021 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 21-10342

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00278-LMM-JSA-1 ____________________

Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Hugo Valencia Mendoza appeals his sentence of imprison- ment for 210 months following his guilty plea for conspiring to pos- sess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846, and aiding and abetting the possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in viola- tion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mendoza contends the district court erred by applying a two-level enhance- ment under U.S.S.G. § 2D.1.1(b)(5) for his offense involving the im- portation of methamphetamine. He argues that the word “in- volved” in § 2D.1.1(b)(5) is unconstitutionally vague. After careful review, we affirm. The district court committed no error.1 Mendoza’s argu- ment is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). In Beckles, the Supreme Court

1 We review constitutional challenges to a district judge’s use of the Sentenc- ing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2015). USCA11 Case: 21-10342 Date Filed: 11/29/2021 Page: 3 of 4

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held that the advisory Sentencing Guidelines cannot be challenged as unconstitutionally vague. 137 S. Ct. at 892. The Supreme Court explained that the “void for vagueness” doctrine has been applied to two kinds of criminal laws: “laws that define criminal offenses and laws that fix the permissible sentences for criminal offenses.” Id. Because the Guidelines do neither, but rather serve as a non- binding guide to aid judges in their sentencing, the vagueness doc- trine does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. Further, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Guidelines do not interfere with the two policies that the void for vagueness doctrine protects—pro- vision of notice and the avoidance of arbitrary enforcement. Id. at 894. Mendoza’s attempt to distinguish Beckles fails. He contends that because of the vagueness of the word “involved” under U.S.S.G. § 2D.1.1(b)(5), 2 district court judges across the country could apply the enhancement to anyone no matter how far down the chain of distribution. But in this specific case, it makes no dif- ference how the district court applied the enhancement provision because Mendoza challenges only the vagueness of § 2D.1.1(b)(5), and the Supreme Court held that the advisory guidelines—

2 We previously declined to interpret the word “involved” narrowly and de- termined the language used by the Sentencing Guidelines supports a broader reading of the word “involved.” See United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 784 (11th Cir. 2007). USCA11 Case: 21-10342 Date Filed: 11/29/2021 Page: 4 of 4

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including § 2D.1.1(b)(5)—cannot be unconstitutionally vague in any case as a matter of law. See Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 894–95. AFFIRMED.