United States v. Galloway Rich, III
United States v. Galloway Rich, III
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 21-11904 Date Filed: 12/08/2021 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
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No. 21-11904 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus GALLOWAY RICH, III,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cr-00036-RV-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 21-11904 Date Filed: 12/08/2021 Page: 2 of 3
2 Opinion of the Court 21-11904
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, LUCK and LAGOA, Cir- cuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Galloway Rich III, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the de- nial of his motion for compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court ruled that Rich identified “noth- ing that constitutes an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason for compassionate release,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, and, in the alternative, that there were “no [statutory sentencing] factors that warrant a reduction or release now,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We affirm. We review the denial of a motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erro- neous.” Id. (quoting Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2019)). A district “court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed” except in specified circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2020). Section 3582(c), as amended by the First Step Act, gives the district court discretion to “reduce the term of imprison- ment . . . after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable” if a reduction is warranted for USCA11 Case: 21-11904 Date Filed: 12/08/2021 Page: 3 of 3
21-11904 Opinion of the Court 3
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” and “is consistent with ap- plicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). So the district court may deny a motion to reduce because no “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist or because relief is inappropriate based on the statutory sentencing factors. See United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021). We need not address Rich’s argument that the statutory sen- tencing factors weighed in favor of early release because we can affirm on the alternative ground that he failed to establish an ex- traordinary and compelling reason to justify his early release. Rich argued that he risked contracting COVID-19 in prison based on his body mass index of 30.7 and his hypertension. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). The district court found that Rich’s medical conditions did not qualify as extraordinary and compelling enough to warrant early release. See Harris, 989 F.3d at 912. The district court also found that “the risks [Rich faced] from COVID-19 are now quite low while he is incarcerated” due to measures under- taken by the prison system to prevent transmission. And the district court correctly reasoned that a reduction of Rich’s sentence had to comport with the definition of “extraordinary and compelling rea- sons” in section 1B1.13. See United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1252–62 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 20-1732 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2021). We AFFIRM the denial of Rich’s motion for compassionate release.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished