United States v. Corey Monroe

USCA11 Case: 21-13714 Date Filed: 02/11/2022 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

No. 21-13714

Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus COREY MONROE,

Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:09-cr-60063-WPD-2

____________________ 2 Opinion of the Court 21-13714 Before LUCK, LAGOA, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Corey Monroe appeals his six-month sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release, arguing that his sen- tence is substantively unreasonable because the district court fo- cused solely on his drug use when imposing his sentence. After review, 1 we affirm.

When examining the substantive reasonableness of a sen- tence, we consider the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. 2 United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935 (11th Cir. 2016). The district court abuses its discretion if it: “(1) fails to 21-13714 Opinion of the Court 3 afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac- tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).

The weight given to any § 3553(a) factor is left to the sound discretion of the district court, and we will not substitute our own judgment by reweighing these factors. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013). While the unjustified reliance on a single factor may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence, the district court may attach great weight to a single factor. Id.; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 57 (2007) (explaining the dis- trict court “quite reasonably attached great weight to the fact that Gall voluntarily withdrew from the conspiracy”). We held a sen- tence was substantively unreasonable where the district court fo- cused “virtually exclusively” on one factor and nearly abandoned consideration of other relevant factors. United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1161 (11th Cir. 2013).

Monroe failed to show his sentence is unreasonable because the district court did not focus solely on his drug use when sentenc- ing him. See Trailer, 827 F.3d at 935; United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating the party challenging the sentence must show that it is unreasonable considering the record and the § 3553(a) factors). Before sentencing Monroe, the district court listed other factors it had considered, including that Monroe had complied with supervised release for the prior three years, was 4 Opinion of the Court 21-13714 employed during that time, and admitted to the violation. The dis- trict court noted many of these factors were mitigating, and it ulti- mately varied below Monroe’s guidelines range. The district court was permitted to place great weight on Monroe’s drug use, and it did not abandon the consideration of other relevant factors. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 57; McQueen, 727 F.3d at 1161; Kuhlman, 711 F.3d at 1327.

AFFIRMED.