USCA11 Case: 20-14442 Date Filed: 03/14/2022 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 20-14442 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DANIEL VARGAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cr-00115-SPC-MRM-3 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 20-14442 Date Filed: 03/14/2022 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 20-14442

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, LUCK and LAGOA, Cir- cuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: This appeal returns to us after a remand to resentence Dan- iel Vargas based on the miscalculation of his criminal history cate- gory as level II instead of level I. United States v. Vargas, 792 F.

App’x 764, 779 (11th Cir. 2019). On remand, the district court rem- edied its error and resentenced Vargas to 188 months of imprison- ment for conspiring to distribute and for possessing more than 1 kilogram of heroin. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), 846; 18 U.S.C. § 2. Vargas argues that his sentence is procedurally and substan- tively unreasonable. We affirm.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of dis- cretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court must “commit[] no significant procedural error, such as fail- ing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . .” Id. We will disturb “the sentence if, but only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dic- tated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

USCA11 Case: 20-14442 Date Filed: 03/14/2022 Page: 3 of 4

20-14442 Opinion of the Court 3 The government argues that Vargas’s challenge to the three- level enhancement of his sentence for his role as a manager of the drug conspiracy, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), is barred by the law-of-the- case doctrine, but we conclude that he has abandoned the issue. “[A]n appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only pass- ing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Florid- ian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). Vargas asserts sum- marily that the “imposition of a three level increase for [his] role is wholly unsupported by the evidence presented: the record does not reflect the exercise of any independent control, influence, or decision-making authority required to sustain the § 3B1.1(b) en- hancement.” Due to Vargas’s omission of facts, supporting legal authority, or any meaningful discussion of the issue, we deem abandoned his challenge to the three-level enhancement.

Vargas’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. The record re- futes his argument that the district court failed to consider the stat- utory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553. The district court refer- enced section 3553(a) and most of the sentencing factors when re- jecting Vargas’s request for a downward variance to 120 months and sentencing him within his advisory guideline range of 168 to months of imprisonment. The district court considered Var- gas’s coconspirators’ sentences, Vargas’s role as a manager of a “large” drug conspiracy, his responsibility for 1.35 kilograms of her- oin, his status as “the third individual in [the] hierarchy . . . [of the] heroin organization,” his coordination with his cohorts, his USCA11 Case: 20-14442 Date Filed: 03/14/2022 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 20-14442 packaging and transportation of drugs, his drug sales and training other persons to sell, his collection of and sharing in the drug pro- ceeds, and the presence of guns with the illegal substances. The dis- trict court also considered that Vargas was an “addict” and had completed a drug and alcohol treatment program. The district court also acknowledged its earlier mistake in miscalculating Var- gas’s criminal history category and “t[ook] that into consideration” “[i]n fashioning the sentence.”

Vargas’s sentence is substantively reasonable. The district court reasonably determined that a sentence of 188 months of im- prisonment accounted for Vargas’s background and provided ade- quate punishment for his relative culpability in the heroin-traffick- ing conspiracy. See id. And the selection of a sentence less than the statutory maximum of life imprisonment and within Vargas’s guideline range suggests that the sentence is reasonable. See United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). Vargas argues that the reimposition of the same sentence reflects that it is vindic- tive, but the careful consideration of the sentencing factors by the district court dispels the notion of any vengeance on its part. See United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010, 1019 (11th Cir. 2014). The district court did not abuse its discretion.

We AFFIRM Vargas’s sentence.