USCA11 Case: 21-10773 Date Filed: 03/28/2022 Page: 1 of 6

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 21-10773 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus HOLLIS THOMPSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-00119-TFM-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 21-10773 Date Filed: 03/28/2022 Page: 2 of 6

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Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Hollis Thompson appeals his 14-month sentence upon rev- ocation of supervised release. He argues that his sentence was sub- stantively unreasonable because the district court gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, failed to give consider- ation to factors that were due significant weight, and committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the proper factors. We disa- gree and affirm. We generally review a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release for reasonableness. See United States v. Van- dergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). When reviewing for procedural reasonableness, we consider legal issues de novo and reviews factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010). When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we consider the totality of the cir- cumstances under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show that the sentence is unrea- sonable considering the record and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). If an appellant did not object on the basis of procedural rea- sonableness before the district court, we review for plain error. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1307. But a defendant’s argument for a specific sentence in the district court preserves for appeal a claim USCA11 Case: 21-10773 Date Filed: 03/28/2022 Page: 3 of 6

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that a longer sentence was substantively unreasonable. See Hol- guin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766–67 (2020). A defendant is not required to raise a specific objection that the sen- tence is unreasonable, which is the standard of review for appeal, but need only bring to the district court’s attention his view that a longer sentence is greater than necessary. See id. In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first con- sider whether the district court committed a procedural error, such as failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guideline range. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We ensure that the district court treated the Guidelines as advisory, considered the § 3553(a) factors, did not select a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and adequately explained the chosen sentence. See id. A district court’s acknowl- edgment that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments is usually sufficient. See United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009). A court can abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrele- vant factor significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judg- ment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Thus, a district court’s unjustified reliance on any one § 3553(a) factor may be indicative of an unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). Though the district court is required to evaluate all of the § 3553(a) factors, the weight USCA11 Case: 21-10773 Date Filed: 03/28/2022 Page: 4 of 6

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accorded to each factor is within the sound discretion of the district court. See United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d 1267, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2014). Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we will affirm any sentence that falls within the range of reasonable sentences, even if we would have decided that a different sentence was more appropriate. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1191. Although we do not automatically presume a sentence falling within the guideline range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be rea- sonable. See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court may revoke supervised release after consid- ering “the factors set forth in [§§] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The enumerated § 3553(a) factors include, in relevant part, (1) the na- ture and circumstances of the offense and the history and charac- teristics of the defendant; (2) the need to afford adequate deter- rence to criminal conduct; (3) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; (4) the need to provide the defend- ant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (5) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range under the Guide- lines; and (6) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentenc- ing Commission. See § 3553(a). Absent from § 3583(e) is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which provides that a district court consider “the USCA11 Case: 21-10773 Date Filed: 03/28/2022 Page: 5 of 6

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need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punish- ment for the offense.” § 3553(a)(2)(A). The introduction to Chap- ter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines explains that the Commission adopted the position that, in revoking supervised release, a district court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A, intro. comment. In Vandergrift, we considered, under plain error review, whether a district court’s consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) in impos- ing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release was procedur- ally unreasonable. 754 F.3d at 1308–09. We recognized that nei- ther we nor the Supreme Court had addressed whether it was an error to consider a factor listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A) when imposing a sentence after revoking supervised release and that those circuits that had published an opinion addressing the issue were split. See id. However, we held that, considering the lack of clear binding precedent and the circuit split, a district court’s consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) in imposing a sentence upon revocation of super- vised release was not plain error. See id. Here, as an initial matter, the district court’s consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) in imposing a sentence upon revocation of super- vised release, an issue which Mr. Thompson did not raise at sen- tencing and which we have considered to be a question of proce- dural reasonableness, was not plain error, as it was not contrary to USCA11 Case: 21-10773 Date Filed: 03/28/2022 Page: 6 of 6

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binding precedent. Moreover, Mr. Thompson’s sentence was sub- stantively reasonable because it was below the statutory maximum and within the guideline range and the district court considered and did not abuse its discretion in weighing the applicable § 3553(a) factors, including his background and characteristics, and the cir- cumstances of his violation of the terms of his supervised release (which involved use of a controlled substance, discharge from a residential re-entry center, and the improper use of a phone at the center). AFFIRMED.