United States v. Jose Manuel Hernandez-Miranda

USCA11 Case: 21-13178 Date Filed: 04/14/2022 Page: 1 of 7

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

No. 21-13178 Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOSE MANUEL HERNANDEZ-MIRANDA,

Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:98-cr-00436-RAL-TGW-4

____________________ Before BRANCH, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jose Manuel Hernandez-Miranda, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 1 The government, in turn, moves for summary affirmance and a stay of the briefing schedule. In response, Hernandez-Miranda argues that he established extraordinary and compelling reasons for purposes of § 3582(c)(1)(A) and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors warrant granting his motion. He also moves a second time for the appointment of counsel. 2

Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 3

We grant the government’s motion for summary affirmance because it is clearly correct as a matter of law. Generally, a court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section 3582(c)(1)(A), however, provides the following limited exception: the court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP], or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . ., after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 4 “The ‘applicable policy statement[ ]’ to which § 3582(c)(1)(A) refers states, in turn, that, the court may reduce a term of imprisonment if, as relevant here, it ‘determines that . . . the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community.’” United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13). Thus, under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court may reduce a movant’s imprisonment term if: (1) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing so, (2) the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) favor doing so, and (3) doing so is consistent with the policy statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Id. (quotation marks omitted). If the district court finds against the movant on any one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief, and need not analyze the other requirements. United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2021); Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38 (explaining that “nothing on the face of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a court to conduct the compassionate-release analysis in any particular order”).

The Sentencing Commission defines “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for purposes of § 3582(c)(1)(A) in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, and we have held that “district courts are bound by” this definition. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1); see also Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1247, 1262–63. Pursuant to this definition, there are four circumstances under which “extraordinary and compelling reasons exist”: (A) the defendant suffers from (i) “a terminal illness,” or (ii) a permanent health condition “that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self- care within the environment of a correctional facility from which he or she is not expected to recover”; (B) the defendant is “at least 65 years old,” “is experiencing a serious [age-related] deterioration in physical or mental health,” and “has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less”; (C) the defendant’s assistance is needed in caring for the defendant’s minor child, spouse, or registered partner due to (i) “[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child or minor children” or (ii) “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner”; and (D) there exist “other” extraordinary and compelling reasons “[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1 (A)–(D)).

Hernandez-Miranda does not argue that he meets the extraordinary and compelling reasons as defined under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Instead, he argues that § 1B1.13 is not binding, and courts have discretionary authority to determine what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason. He asserts that he demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons based on the following: (1) he was sentenced to life imprisonment for acts he committed as a juvenile, in violation of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (holding that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”);5 (2) if he was sentenced today, he would not be subject to “stacked” consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (3) his indictment was multiplicitous; (4) he contracted COVID-19 in 2020, and the prison provided inadequate medical care related to COVID-19 outbreaks; (5) the conditions of his confinement are unduly harsh and violate the Eighth Amendment; and (6) he has a low I.Q.

Hernandez-Miranda’s argument that § 1B1.13 is not binding and that courts have the discretion to determine what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons is foreclosed by binding precedent. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262. And none of Hernandez- Miranda’s asserted reasons satisfy the criteria of § 1B1.3. 6 Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that Hernandez-Miranda benefit him because “he was not a minor when he committed the conduct giving rise to his convictions. He was an adult.” “failed to set forth extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying his entitlement to compassionate release.”

Accordingly, because the government’s position “is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case,” we GRANT the government’s motion for summary affirmance. Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at1162.

We DENY as moot the government’s request to stay the briefing schedule and Hernandez-Miranda’s second motion for appointment of counsel.