Frederick Wroten v. J. Langford Floyd
Frederick Wroten v. J. Langford Floyd
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 21-13863 Date Filed: 04/27/2022 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13863 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
FREDERICK WROTEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus J. LANGFORD FLOYD, Judge, JUDY NEWCOMBE, District Attorney, J. CLARK STANKOSKI, Judge, ROBERT WILTERS, District Attorney, USCA11 Case: 21-13863 Date Filed: 04/27/2022 Page: 2 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 21-13863
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-00121-TFM-N ____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Frederick Wroten, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim because it was barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and because the defendants were immune from claims for monetary relief. He contends the district court erred in finding no federal claims remained in his action and contends a ruling on his allegations would not undermine his other state convictions or af- fect his release. After review, 1 we affirm.
1 We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an in forma pauperis (IFP) complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2001). Section 1915(e) pro- vides, inter alia, that any IFP action or appeal shall be dismissed at any time if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). USCA11 Case: 21-13863 Date Filed: 04/27/2022 Page: 3 of 4
21-13863 Opinion of the Court 3
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for private citizens against government actors for violating their constitutional rights and other federal laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sen- tence invalid in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show the conviction or sentence “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by ex- ecutive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486– 87. If this type of § 1983 action is brought before the challenged conviction or sentence is invalidated, it must be dismissed. Id. at 487. Thus, the district court considers whether a favorable judg- ment for the plaintiff would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id. If the outcome would imply invalid- ity, then the plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can establish the conviction or sentence was already inval- idated. Id. We have clarified that for Heck to apply, a successful § 1983 suit and the underlying conviction must be logically contradictory such that the § 1983 suit would negate the conviction. See Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 879–80, 884 (11th Cir. 2007). We ask whether “it is possible that the facts could allow a successful § 1983 suit and the underlying conviction both to stand without contradicting each other.” Harrigan v. Metro Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977 F.3d 1185, 1193 (11th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (quotation marks USCA11 Case: 21-13863 Date Filed: 04/27/2022 Page: 4 of 4
4 Opinion of the Court 21-13863
omitted). The Heck doctrine applies when the “invalidation of a conviction or speedier release would . . . automatically flow from success on the § 1983 claim.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In Harrigan, we held Heck did not bar Harrigan’s § 1983 suit because, if his § 1983 excessive-force claim was successful, it would not nec- essarily imply the invalidity of his state-court convictions as there was a version of facts that would allow his punishment to stand alongside a successful § 1983 suit. Id. at 1196–97. The district court did not err in dismissing Wroten’s second amended complaint because it was barred by Heck. If Wroten’s § 1983 action was successful, it would have invalidated his convic- tions and sentences because he was directly challenging their valid- ity by asserting they were obtained in violation of the U.S. Consti- tution. He also conceded his convictions and sentences had not been previously invalidated. Unlike in Harrigan, there was no ver- sion of facts that would allow Wroten’s convictions and sentences to stand if his § 1983 suit succeeded because his convictions and sentences could not stand if the issuing court lacked jurisdiction. See id. Because Wroten was thus effectively collaterally attacking his convictions and sentences and they had not been invalidated, Heck applied, given that the success of his action would necessarily have implied the invalidity of his convictions and sentences. See Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87; Dyer, 488 F.3d at 879-80, 884. AFFIRMED.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished