USCA11 Case: 21-11665 Date Filed: 07/01/2022 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 21-11665 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MALIC STEPHENS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00064-WTM-CLR-2 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 21-11665 Date Filed: 07/01/2022 Page: 2 of 5

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Malic Stephens appeals his 150-month sentence following his conviction for one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). On appeal, Stephens asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court did not sentence him to the low end of the guideline range. After careful review, we affirm.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence un- der a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A criminal defendant preserves the issue of the substantive reasonableness of his sentence for review by advocating for a less severe sentence. Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766–67 (2020). We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the sentencing court and will some- times affirm the district court even if it would have done something differently because the question is whether the district court’s de- cision was “in the ballpark of permissible outcomes.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015) (quo- tation marks omitted).

In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we consider the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but USCA11 Case: 21-11665 Date Filed: 07/01/2022 Page: 3 of 5

21-11665 Opinion of the Court 3 not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 1 The court must consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, but it may give greater weight to some factors over others -- a decision that is within its sound discretion. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. In particular, we’ve said that, “[d]istrict courts have broad leeway in deciding how much weight to give to prior crimes the defendant has committed.” Id. at 1261. The district court is not required to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors, and an acknowl- edgement that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors will suffice.

United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007).

However, a sentence may be substantively unreasonable when a court unjustifiably relies on any single § 3553(a) factor, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence on im- permissible factors, or selects the sentence arbitrarily. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191–92. A sentence that suffers from one of these symp- toms is not per se unreasonable; rather, we must examine the to- tality of the circumstances to determine the sentence’s

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The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the rec- ord, the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the substantial def- erence afforded sentencing courts. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256. While we do not formally presume that a within-guideline- range sentence is reasonable, we ordinarily expect it to be so. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). In addi- tion, a district court’s imposition of a sentence well below the stat- utory maximum penalty is an indicator of reasonableness. United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sen- tencing Stephens to 150 months’ imprisonment. 2 As the record Stephens preserved a substantive reasonableness challenge by advocating for a less severe sentence. Holguin-Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 766–67.

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21-11665 Opinion of the Court 5 reflects, the court acknowledged that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments, elaborated on the fac- tors relevant to its decision -- especially Stephens’s criminal history -- and expressed a desire for Stephens to avoid future law-breaking.

Indeed, Stephens’s criminal history, which involved various rob- bery, theft and firearm offenses, was serious, lengthy, and similar to the offense conduct here, which also involved a robbery. On this record, the court acted well within its “broad leeway” in giving Stephens’s prior criminal history significant weight. Rosales- Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1261. This is especially true since his past of- fenses directly related to his history and characteristics and the like- lihood that he would commit future crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Moreover, Stephens’s 150-month sentence was within the guide- line range and well below the statutory maximum penalty of 240 months’ imprisonment, both factors that indicate reasonableness.

Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746; Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1310.

Accordingly, Stephens has not shown that his sentence is substantively reasonable, and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.