USCA11 Case: 22-10268 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10268 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus GARY JAY GOLDBERG,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:13-cr-80082-KAM-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 22-10268 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 22-10268

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Gary Goldberg, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order denying his pro se construed successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. In support, he argues that the district court should have construed his motion as having been brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and that it did not provide him with proper notice when it construed his motion as one under § 2255, citing Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003). He also requests that we treat his brief as an application for permission to file a successive § 2255 motion. The government responded by moving for summary affir- mance and for a stay of the briefing schedule. It contends that Goldberg filed an earlier 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion that the district court denied on its merits, and thus, he had to get our permission to file a successive motion. Summary disposition is appropriate, in part, where “the po- sition of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a § 2255 motion as successive. McIver v. United States, 307 F.3d 1327, 1329 USCA11 Case: 22-10268 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 3 of 4

22-10268 Opinion of the Court 3

(11th Cir. 2002). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen- alty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, a federal prisoner may only file one § 2255 motion, and assuming that it is denied in a “judgment on the merits,” he must obtain leave from the Court of Appeals before filing a successive motion. See Boyd v. United States, 754 F.3d 1298, 1299-1302 (11th Cir. 2014); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Without our authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a successive habeas petition. Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). “Federal courts are obligated to look beyond the label of a pro se inmate’s motion to determine if it is cognizable under a dif- ferent statutory framework.” United States v. Stossel, 348 F.3d 1320, 1322 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003). Therefore, a district court is au- thorized to recharacterize a pro se litigant’s motion for relief from a criminal judgment as a § 2255 motion to vacate. See Castro, 540 U.S. at 382-83. However, a district court must warn a pro se litigant about restrictions on second or successive § 2255 motions when it construes his motion as a first § 2255 motion. Id. at 383. Pursuant to § 2241, federal courts may grant habeas relief to prisoners who are being detained in violation of the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “A prisoner in custody pursuant to a federal court judgment may proceed under § 2241 only when he raises claims outside the scope of § 2255(a), that is, claims concern- ing execution of his sentence.” McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill In- dus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1089 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted) (“A motion to vacate covers only USCA11 Case: 22-10268 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 22-10268

challenges to the validity of a sentence, but the saving clause and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cover challenges to the execu- tion of a sentence.”). Here, the district court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction because Goldberg’s initial § 2255 motion had been de- nied on its merits and he had not received our permission to file a successive § 2255 motion. To the extent that he argues that the district court should have construed his motion as being filed under § 2241, his motion was not cognizable under § 2241 because he at- tacked the validity of his sentence. Also, his Castro argument is unavailing because the district court did not construe his motion as a first § 2255 motion but a successive one, so the Castro warnings were unnecessary. Finally, we deny his request to construe his in- itial brief as a successive application because, while his appeal was pending, he filed a separate application and raised the same argu- ments that he raises in his initial brief, and we denied it. Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion for summary affirmance, DENY as moot its motion to stay the briefing schedule, AFFIRM the denial of Goldberg’s construed § 2255 mo- tion, and DENY his request to construe his initial brief as a succes- sive application.