Milargo L. Molina-Siguenza v. U.S. Attorney General

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Milargo L. Molina-Siguenza v. U.S. Attorney General

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 22-10661 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2022 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 22-10661 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

MILARGO L. MOLINA-SIGUENZA, Petitioner, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

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Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A206-710-380 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 22-10661 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2022 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 22-10661

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Cir- cuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Milargo Molina-Siguenza, a native and citizen of El Salva- dor, petitions for review of the denial of her applications for asylum and withholding of removal and for relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De- grading Treatment or Punishment. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b), 1231(b)(3). The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed with the immigration judge that Molina-Siguenza was ineligible for asylum and with- holding of removal because she failed to prove past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Board also agreed that Molina-Siguenza failed to prove that the El Salvadoran gov- ernment was unable or unwilling to protect her from private actors or that she was likely to be tortured if she returned to El Salvador. We deny the petition. When the Board affirms the immigration judge’s decision, we review both decisions. Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 914 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2019). Our review is “limited” by “the highly defer- ential substantial evidence test,” under which we must affirm the decision so long as it is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1237 (11th Cir. 2006). Under that test, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the deci- sion of the immigration judge and draw all reasonable inferences USCA11 Case: 22-10661 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2022 Page: 3 of 4

22-10661 Opinion of the Court 3

in favor of that decision. Id. at 1236. We can reverse “only when the record compels a reversal; the mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). To establish eligibility for asylum, Molina-Siguenza bore the burden of proving that she is a refugee under the Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B); Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005). The Act defines “refugee” as a person “who is un- able or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail [] herself of the protection of, [her country of nationality] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The record sup- ports the finding that Molina-Siguenza failed to satisfy her burden. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Mo- lina-Siguenza did not suffer past persecution. Molina-Siguenza tes- tified that in 2012 her sister Elisa received a text message from an individual, later believed to be a cousin, threatening to sexually abuse them and two other sisters. Molina-Siguenza testified that in 2014 a neighborhood gang member called “Salvador” followed her and threatened to sexually abuse the sisters, but he never touched them. And in two other instances, an unknown man grabbed her chest, but she ran home. These isolated and brief incidents consid- ered cumulatively do not amount to persecution. Persecution “is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment USCA11 Case: 22-10661 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2022 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 22-10661

our society regards as offensive.” Murugan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 10 F.4th 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2021). Even verbal threats and minor physical abuse do not compel a finding that an alien has suffered persecution. See Djonda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008); Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231 (holding threats and menacing phone calls did not amount to persecution). Substantial evidence also supports the finding that Mo- lina-Siguenza lacks a well-founded fear of future persecution. With- out evidence of past persecution, Molina-Siguenza is not entitled to a presumption of future persecution. See Murugan, 10 F.4th at 1193. And the record does not compel a finding that Mo- lina-Siguenza would be singled out for persecution. See id. Mo- lina-Siguenza identified only a handful of incidents of sexual harass- ment and threats by a cousin and neighborhood gang member and groping by two unknown men. And although she testified about the large gang presence in her neighborhood, she also testified that she was unaware of any instances of gang violence against women there. Molina-Siguenza’s evidence of being subjected to sexual har- assment and of an unsympathetic police force is insufficient to com- pel a reversal of the finding that she failed to prove a well-founded fear of persecution. Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231-32. And because Molina-Siguenza “failed to establish a claim of asylum on the mer- its, [she] necessarily fails to establish eligibility for withholding of removal or protection under CAT.” Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1288 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005). We DENY Molina-Siguenza’s petition for review.

Reference

Status
Unpublished