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[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-11448 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ FAGALE S. GRANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus ELMORE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DALE BAIN, in his Official and or Individual capacities as member of of the Elmore County Board of Education, DAVID JONES, in his Official and or Individual capacities as member of of the Elmore County Board of Education, USCA11 Case: 22-11448 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 01/19/2023 Page: 2 of 8

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00058-JTA ____________________ Before NEWSOM, GRANT and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Appellant Fagale Grant, an African-American female who formerly worked as a teacher, appeals the grant of summary judg- ment to the defendants, including seven members of the Elmore County Board of Education, Board Superintendent, Richard Den- nis, and the Elmore County Board of Education (the “Board”), on her claims of, inter alia, race and age discrimination. Grant argues USCA11 Case: 22-11448 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 01/19/2023 Page: 3 of 8

22-11448 Opinion of the Court 3 that she presented a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evi- dence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that the defend- ants intentionally discriminated against her based on her race and that led to the termination of her employment. Additionally, Grant argues that she has met her burden in showing a prima facie case of age discrimination, in addition to also presenting a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that the defendants intentionally discriminated against her based on her age in connection with her termination.1 Having read the parties’ briefs and reviewed the record, we affirm the dis- trict court’s 2 grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

I.

When appropriate, we will review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, “viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving party.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005).

Ct. 95 (2022).

2 The parties consented to have a magistrate judge enter a dispositive final judgment in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, et seq.

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Campbell, 26 F.4th at 872-73; see Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.

Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating an appellant must clearly and specifically identify in her brief any issue she wants the appellate court to address). Moreover, a district court's judgment should be affirmed if an appellant fails to challenge each of the court's independent, alternative grounds for its ruling. Id. The record here demonstrates that Grant argues for the first time on appeal that she established a “convincing mosaic” of cir- cumstantial evidence allowing a jury to infer the defendants’ inten- tional race discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As she has not argued that extraordi- nary circumstances exist warranting an examination of the issue on the merits, however, we conclude that she has forfeited the argu- ment on appeal.

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22-11448 Opinion of the Court 5 Additionally, Grant fails to challenge the district court’s find- ing that she did not establish a prima facie case of race discrimina- tion under McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Although the evidence showed that her employment ended after she announced an intent to voluntarily retire, there was no evidence that she suffered an adverse employ- ment action or that the defendants treated a similarly situated com- parator more favorably than her. Thus, she has abandoned any challenge to this argument on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants as to Grant’s claims of race discrimination.

II.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), prohibits certain actions by an employer, in- cluding the termination of an employee based on her age, which must be age 40 or older. Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014); see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). A plaintiff may support a claim under the ADEA through either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Mazzeo, 746 F.3d at 1270. To ultimately prevail, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial), that age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged employer decision. Id. A plaintiff can employ different frameworks to survive sum- mary judgment by using circumstantial evidence to support her ADEA claim. See Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2013) (ADEA case discussing the frameworks under McDonnell USCA11 Case: 22-11448 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 01/19/2023 Page: 6 of 8

See id. at 1270-71. Under a discriminatory-discharge theory, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) she was a member of a protected group; (2) she was subject to an ad- verse employment action; (3) a substantially younger person filled the position from which the plaintiff was fired; and (4) she was qual- ified for the job in question. Id. at 1270 (citation omitted). By con- trast, under a reduction-of-force analysis, a plaintiff may show that where the employer eliminated her position: (A) she belonged to a protected group; (B) she was qualified for the position held or to assume another position at the time of discharge; and (C) sufficient evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the USCA11 Case: 22-11448 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 01/19/2023 Page: 7 of 8

22-11448 Opinion of the Court 7 employer intended to discriminate based on age through its em- ployment decision. Id. at 1271. Generally, a discriminatory-dis- charge analysis is appropriate where the plaintiff’s position exists after she was terminated and filled by a younger person, and a re- duction-in-force analysis is appropriate where the employer elimi- nates the plaintiff’s position. See id. at 1270-71.

We presume that resignations are voluntary, unless an em- ployer forces the employee to resign by coercion, duress, or mis- representation of a material fact. Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1995). There are several factors a court should consider in evaluating whether a resignation was forced, including whether the employee: (1) was given some alter- native to resignation; (2) understood the nature of the choice given; (3) had a reasonable time in which to choose; (4) was allowed to choose the effective date of the resignation; and (5) had the advice of counsel. Id. A resignation may be voluntary even when the only other alternative is facing possible termination for cause. Id. The record shows that the district court did not err in grant- ing summary judgment on Grant’s age discrimination claim be- cause Grant voluntarily set in motion the events which resulted in her retirement. Grant was aware that the school Superintendent annually distributed a memorandum in February asking teachers whether they would return the following school year, which ena- bled the system to identify upcoming vacancies, advertise those po- sitions, and hire as needed. Having decided in December of 2016 to retire, she responded to the Superintendent’s inquiry by USCA11 Case: 22-11448 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 01/19/2023 Page: 8 of 8

Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af- firm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defend- ants on Grant’s claims of race and age discrimination in her em- ployment.

AFFIRMED.