USCA11 Case: 21-13995 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 21-13995 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus RICARDO AMAUI MONTAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00273-LMM-CMS-2 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 21-13995 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 21-13995

Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Ricardo Montas appeals the 120-month prison sentence he received for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute at least grams of methamphetamine. He argues that the district court committed procedural errors at sentencing and imposed a substan- tively unreasonable sentence. The government has filed a motion to dismiss Montas’s appeal, based on the sentence appeal waiver in his plea agreement. We now grant that motion because Montas’s appeal waiver is enforceable and bars his challenge.

We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.

United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, the government must show either that (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver dur- ing the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the defend- ant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. Id. Here, the government has shown both.

In Montas’s plea agreement, a section titled and underlined, “Limited Waiver of Appeal,” stated that Montas expressly waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his convictions or sentences “on any ground,” except that he could “file a direct appeal of an USCA11 Case: 21-13995 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 3 of 5

21-13995 Opinion of the Court 3 upward departure or upward variance above the sentencing guide- line range as calculated by the [d]istrict [c]ourt,” raise claims re- garding his counsel’s ineffective assistance, or file a cross-appeal if the government initiated a direct appeal. Another section of the agreement stated that there were “no other agreements, promises, representations, or understandings between [Montas] and the [g]overnment.”

Appended to the plea agreement was a statement signed by Montas confirming that he had read the agreement, carefully re- viewed each part with his attorney, understood the terms and con- ditions therein, and voluntarily agreed to those terms and condi- tions. He confirmed that he understood the appeal waiver and the narrow exceptions in which he could appeal. And Montas indi- cated that no one had threatened or forced him to plead guilty.

The district court also specifically questioned Montas about the appeal waiver during the plea colloquy. After the government summarized the plea agreement and read the terms of the appeal waiver into the record, the court emphasized that Montas would be “giving up [his] rights to appeal in almost all circumstances,” in- cluding “most of [his] right to appeal [his] sentence.” Addressing Montas, the court stated, “[A]bsent the very limited circumstances in which you have reserved your right to appeal, you will not be able to contest the sentence even if it’s wrong or you’re unhappy with it.” Montas confirmed his understanding, and Montas’s coun- sel stated that he had discussed the appeal waiver with his client.

Montas also said that he had sufficient time to discuss the case with USCA11 Case: 21-13995 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 4 of 5

4 Opinion of the Court 21-13995 his attorney and had no other questions before pleading guilty.

The district court accepted Montas’s guilty plea, finding it “know- ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.”

At sentencing, the district court calculated a guideline im- prisonment range of 168 to 210 months and heard arguments as to a reasonable sentence. The government asked for a sentence of months, which it asserted was justified in part by Montas’s flee- ing the country to avoid facing charges in this case. Montas re- sponded that there was no evidence he left the country to avoid prosecution, and he argued he should receive a similar sentence as a codefendant to avoid unwarranted disparities. The district court sentenced Montas to 120 months, explaining that the sentence took into account “the circumstances of you not immediately facing what you knew were some serious federal charges, that you took a gamble that you could avoid them, and there are consequences for that.”

Montas argues that the district court procedurally and sub- stantively erred by relying in part on an “erroneous conclusion that [he] fled the United States to avoid prosecution.” But the appeal waiver precludes this challenge, even assuming it has merit, be- cause it does not fall into any of the exceptions set forth in the ap- peal waiver. See United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1169 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A waiver of the right to appeal includes a waiver of the right to appeal difficult or debatable legal issues.”). The waiver is enforceable because the district court specifically questioned Mon- tas about the waiver during the plea colloquy, and the record USCA11 Case: 21-13995 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 5 of 5

21-13995 Opinion of the Court 5 otherwise shows that he understood the full significance of the ap- peal wavier. See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.

We there GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss.

APPEAL DISMISSED.