USCA11 Case: 22-12002 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-12002 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ ONEIL JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, versus SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-80399-WPD ____________________ USCA11 Case: 22-12002 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 2 of 5

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Oneil Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, which he purport- edly had filed in March 2021, but which was not discovered by the district court until November 2021, 1 and the denial of his subse- quent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion. On appeal, Johnson argues that his pro se petition, which was filed shortly after the filing of a counseled petition, was not successive because the counseled petition was frivolous.

Generally, a party forfeits a claim on appeal by failing to “plainly and prominently” raise that claim in his initial brief.

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). “When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Id. at 680.

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22-12002 Opinion of the Court 3 However, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

Generally, appeals from § 2254 proceedings require a certif- icate of appealability (“COA”), but “no COA is necessary to appeal the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of a successive habeas petition because such orders are not ‘a final order in a ha- beas corpus proceeding.’ Instead, we may review such a dismissal as a ‘final decision’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Osbourne v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 1261, 1264 n.3 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (quoting Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004)). “The key inquiry into whether an order is ‘final’ for [28 U.S.C.] § 2253 purposes is whether it is an order ‘that disposes of the merits in a habeas corpus proceeding.’” Jackson v. United States, 875 F.3d 1089, 1090 (11th Cir. 2017) (alteration adopted) (quoting Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009)).

“Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s court fil- ing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012)). Absent contrary evidence, such as prison logs or other records, we assume that a prisoner delivered a filing to prison au- thorities on the day when the prisoner signed it. Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). The govern- ment bears the burden of proving that the filing was delivered to USCA11 Case: 22-12002 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 4 of 5

Jeffries, 748 F.3d at 1314.

As to representation by counsel, an individual does not have a right to hybrid representation. Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 1990). Additionally, the Local Rules and Procedures of the Southern District of Florida provide, in part, “[w]hen a party has appeared by attorney, the party cannot there- after appear or act on the party’s own behalf in the action or pro- ceeding, or take any step therein, unless an order of substitution shall first have been made by the Court, after notice to the attorney of such party, and to the opposite party.” S.D. Fla. Local R. 11.1(d)(4).

“It is the law of this [C]ircuit that the right to counsel and the right to proceed pro se exist in the alternative and the decision to permit a defendant to proceed in a hybrid fashion rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. LaChance, 817 F.2d 1491, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court likewise has held that the right to proceed pro se, recognized by Faretta v. Cal- ifornia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), does not require a trial judge to permit hybrid representation. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984).

Here, in light of Johnson’s pro se status, we liberally con- strue his arguments on appeal, despite him abandoning in his ap- pellate brief some of the grounds on which the district court based its dismissal. Regardless of the other bases for its dismissal, we con- clude that the district court did not err in dismissing Johnson’s pro USCA11 Case: 22-12002 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 5 of 5

22-12002 Opinion of the Court 5 se § 2254 petition because it had not permitted hybrid representa- tion, and accordingly, his pro se petition was an unauthorized filing after his retained counsel had filed a § 2254 petition just nineteen days prior. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.