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[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-12101 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SANQUEZ DEONTRA QUEZ BIVENS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00432-WKW-KFP-4 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 22-12101 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 04/13/2023 Page: 2 of 6

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Sanquez Deontra Quez Bivens appeals the district court’s or- der revoking his supervised release and imposing a 24-month sen- tence. Bivens contends he was denied due process because the dis- trict court failed to conduct the proper balancing test under United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994), before admitting pur- ported hearsay evidence during his revocation hearing. After re- view, we affirm the district court.

A defendant’s supervised release may be revoked if the dis- trict court finds by a preponderance of the evidence “the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

The Sixth Amendment does not apply in hearings for the revoca- tion of supervised release, probation, or parole. United States v. Reese, 775 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2015). Similarly, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation hearings. Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. “Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation hearings, the admissibility of hearsay is not automatic. Defendants involved in revocation proceedings are entitled to certain minimal due pro- cess requirements.” Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (involving parole revocation) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (involving probation revocation)). Among these minimal requirements is the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the factfinder specifically finds good USCA11 Case: 22-12101 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 04/13/2023 Page: 3 of 6

22-12101 Opinion of the Court 3 cause for not allowing confrontation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, “which applies to super- vised release revocation, incorporates these same minimal due pro- cess requirements.” Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) pro- vides a person is entitled to the opportunity to appear, present evi- dence, and question any adverse witness, unless the court deter- mines the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C).

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement made by a declarant that a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as- serted in the statement. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). “[I]n deciding whether or not to admit hearsay testimony, the court must balance the defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses against the grounds asserted by the government for denying confrontation.”

Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. The hearsay statement must also be relia- ble. Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Bivens’ supervised release. See United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (reviewing a district court’s revo- cation of supervised release for abuse of discretion). First, the dis- trict court did not abuse its discretion in finding Bivens’ and Tatyana Pringle’s statements were either not hearsay or met a hearsay exception, and thus, were not subject to the balancing test under Frazier. See United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1005 (11th Cir. 2001) (reviewing evidentiary decisions only for a clear abuse of discretion). As to Bivens’ own statements made on the USCA11 Case: 22-12101 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 04/13/2023 Page: 4 of 6

As to Pringle’s statements in the recorded jail calls, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the threats from Bivens to Pringle were meant to prevent her from testifying, and thus, her statements fit squarely under Rule 804(b)(6). Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) (providing hearsay may be admitted when the statement is being offered against a party that wrongfully caused the declar- ant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result).

The court heard Simmons’ testimony regarding the calls, listened to the phone calls, and then later made a finding that Pringle’s ab- sence resulted from Bivens’ threats. On appeal, Bivens argues only that it is unclear whether his statements were intended as threats.

However, we are bound by the district court’s factual finding that Bivens’ statements were threats intended to prevent Pringle from testifying. See United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating we are bound by the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Pringle’s statements were admissible under Rule 804(b)(6) and were, therefore, not hearsay, such that USCA11 Case: 22-12101 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 04/13/2023 Page: 5 of 6

22-12101 Opinion of the Court 5 the Frazier balancing test was not required. See Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114.

Further, as to Pringle’s statements to Simmons on the night of the shooting, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding her statements met the excited utterance exception to Rule 803(2). See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) (providing that, regardless of whether the de- clarant is available as a witness, an “excited utterance” is admissible as a hearsay exception, as it is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused”). Simmons testified he received the call from Pringle shortly after the shooting occurred and she seemed excited and angry, as she yelled into the phone. Though Bivens contends on appeal the startling impact of the incident had passed by the time of Pringle’s call to Simmons, and Pringle’s state- ments were accusatory and not for the purpose of seeking aid, the court found Simmons’ descriptions of that conversation to be cred- ible. Because we are bound by that credibility determination, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Pringle’s state- ments met the excited-utterance exception. See Almand, 992 F.3d at 318; United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating credibility is in the province of the factfinder, and we ordi- narily will not review a district court’s credibility determination).

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