Glenn S. Rhodes v. Superior Judge Daniel Craig

USCA11 Case: 22-12150 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 05/18/2023 Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

No. 22-12150 Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

GLENN S. RHODES,

Plaintiff-Appellant, versus SUPERIOR JUDGE DANIEL CRAIG, Individual and Official Capacity, ADAM LAND, Defense Lawyer, Individual and Official Capacity, BARBARA CLARIDGE,

Plaintiff lawyer, Individual and Official Capacity, SHAWN HAMMOND,

USCA11 Case: 22-12150 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 05/18/2023 Page: 2 of 3 2 Opinion of the Court 22-12150

Plaintiff lawyer, Individual and Official Capacity

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00127-JRH-BKE

____________________ Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and NEWSOM and GRANT, Cir- cuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Glenn Rhodes appeals pro se the dismissal of his complaint against a Georgia superior court judge, Daniel Craig; Rhodes’s for- mer divorce attorneys, Barbara Claridge and Shawn Hammond; and his ex-wife’s divorce attorney, Adam Land. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleged that the defendants violated Rhodes’s civil and constitutional rights during his divorce proceedings in state court. We affirm.

Rhodes argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claims against Hammond as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but we need not address that argument because we can affirm on the alternative ground stated by the district court. Before we will reverse a “judgment that is based on multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect.” Sapuppo v. Allstate

USCA11 Case: 22-12150 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 05/18/2023 Page: 3 of 3 22-12150 Opinion of the Court 3 Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). If the “appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have aban- doned any challenge of that ground . . . .” Id. The district court ruled alternatively that the complaint failed to state a claim against Hammond under section 1983 because Rhodes “failed to allege an- ything that would transform [] Hammond from a private individual to a state actor.” Rhodes failed to challenge this alternative ruling in his initial brief. We affirm on that ground. Id.

The district court dismissed the complaint against Judge Craig and attorneys Land and Claridge for insufficient service of process, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), and Rhodes failed to challenge that ruling in his initial brief or otherwise argue that he properly served these individuals. So he has abandoned any challenge of that ground for dismissal too. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680. And his re- maining arguments are outside the scope of this appeal.

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Rhodes’s complaint and DENY his motion to review residual impact from miscarriages of justice.