USCA11 Case: 22-12832 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 06/12/2023 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-12832 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus TORY LENARD TROUP,

Defendant-Appellant,

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00214-SCJ-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 22-12832 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 06/12/2023 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 22-12832

Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Tory Troup appeals his total sentence after being convicted of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, in vi- olation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846; and conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Specifically, Mr. Troup challenges the enforceability of his appeal waiver as ap- plied to the district court’s order of forfeiture, and he argues that the district court abused its discretion in reaching that decision.

The government now moves to dismiss the appeal as barred by Troup’s appeal waiver. 1 Ordinarily, “[t]he voluntariness of a guilty plea is a question of law reviewed de novo.” United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1993). But, where the defendant neither objects to the plea proceedings nor moves to withdraw the plea, we review the district court’s compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 only for plain error. See United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005). Moreover, issues not raised in an initial brief are forfeited and generally deemed abandoned. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871-72 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022). An appellant fails to brief a claim when he does not “plainly We note that, although the district court also denied certain motions filed by Mr. Troup in 2023, he did not file a new notice of appeal thereafter and, in any event, does not expressly challenge that ruling now on appeal.

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22-12832 Opinion of the Court 3 and prominently” raise it, such as by devoting a discrete section of his argument to the claim. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).

We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.

See United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly and voluntarily. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993).

To establish that a waiver was made knowingly and volun- tarily, the government must show either that: (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver during the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant oth- erwise understood the full significance of the waiver. See id. The government cannot show that an appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary from an examination of the text alone. See id. at 1352. A waiver is enforceable if the defendant claimed to understand it dur- ing the plea colloquy, confirmed that he had read the plea agree- ment and knew it was binding, and entered into the plea agreement freely and voluntarily. See United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1323-24, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a waiver is valid where it was “referenced” at the Rule 11 hearing and where the district court established that the defendant had read and understood “every page and every word” of the plea agreement). Criminal for- feiture constitutes a part of a defendant’s sentence. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39 (1995).

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12832 Here, Mr. Troup waived his right to appeal his total sen- tence, including the forfeiture of property, by knowingly and vol- untarily entering an appeal waiver as part of his plea agreement.

See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351. Specifically, the plea agreement signed by him contained an explicit sentence appeal waiver in which he waived the right to appeal except in certain specified sce- narios. The district court then ensured that he understood that he was waiving the right to appeal his total sentence except in the specified situations by having the government read out the terms of the waiver and by questioning him about the waiver. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351. His argument that his acceptance of the waiver was not knowing and voluntary due to the court’s failure to explic- itly discuss forfeiture is without merit, as it is settled law that crim- inal forfeiture is included under the umbrella of a defendant’s sen- tence. See Libretti, 516 U.S. at 39. Further, his plea agreement, which he testified that he read, understood, and discussed with his attorney, expressly stated that he waived the right to appeal a for- feiture determination, though not in the appeal waiver section. See Weaver, 275 F.3d at 1323-24, 1333.

In sum, Mr. Troup knowingly and voluntarily gave up his right to appeal the district court’s forfeiture determinations. Addi- tionally, none of the exceptions to the waiver apply to this case.

Specifically: (i) the district court did not depart or vary upward from the applicable guideline range (292-365 months’ incarcera- tion) before sentencing Mr. Troup; (ii) he does not argue that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective below; and (iii) the gov- ernment did not file a cross-appeal.

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22-12832 Opinion of the Court 5 Accordingly, the government’s motion is GRANTED, and Mr. Troup’s appeal is DISMISSED.

APPEAL DISMISSED.